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 The Truth in Lending Act: The Survival of a Borrower's Claim for Rescission 
Francesco Ferrantelli Jr. 1 
I. Introduction 
In the years preceding the financial crisis of 2008, the prevalence of mortgage lenders 
issuing home equity loans to individuals who, for many possible reasons, could not repay the 
loans, created a housing bubble that eventually burst.2 One of these loans was given to Kathryn 
McOmie-Gray, who closed a first deed trust loan in 2006 and was provided with various 
disclosure documents to sign pursuant to the Truth In Lending Act (TILA).3 While these 
documents informed Ms. McOmie-Gray of her right to rescind the transaction, the lender failed 
to inform her of the date on which this right to rescind would expire. 4 This failure resulted in the 
disclosure being defective under the Truth in Lending Act and entitling Ms. McOmie-Gray to 
rescission. 5 Two years later, Ms. McOmie-Gray sought to exercise her rescission right by 
notifying the lender of her intention to rescind.6 The bank, however, refused to honor the 
rescission and instead began a year-long negotiation regarding the loan terms. 7 After 
negotiations failed, Ms. McOmie-Gray fmally filed a claim to enforce the rescission, but the 
claim was dismissed by the court as untimely.8 The court found that because the claim was filed 
1 J.D. candidate, expected 2013, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2010, Rutgers University, New 
Brunswick, New Jersey. 
2 JeffSovem, Help for the Perplexed Home Buyer, THE NEW YORK TIMES, July 19, 2012, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07 / 19/opinion/a-guide-for-the-new-mortgage-forrn.htmJ? _r=O ("During the housing 
bubble, countless borrowers took on mortgages they could not repay."). 
3 McOmie-Gray v. Bank of America Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1326 (9th Cir. 2012). The facts of McOmie-Gray 
as reproduced in this section are taken from the opinion of the court which, as the court was ruling upon a motion to 
dismiss, accepted the plaintiff's allegations as true. 
4/d. 
5 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(b) (2011). 
6 McOmie-Gray, 667 F.3d at 1326. 
7 /d. 
8/d 
over three years after the loan was created, it was barred under TILA. 9 The court precluded 
relief even though Ms. McOmie-Gray exercised the right to rescind by notifying the lender a 
year earlier, in accordance with the statutory and regulatory requirements. 10 In essence, the bank 
was able to avoid rescission liability for its own TILA violation by delaying and negotiating with 
Ms. McOmie-Gray until the statutory time limit expired. 11 
The Truth In Lending Act12 requires lenders to make a number of disclosures to 
consumers before finalizing loans, in order to promote the informed use of credit and to protect 
consumers against deceptive lender practices. 13 Though the Act was originally passed in 1968, 
the surge in foreclosure filings following the burst of the mortgage bubble in 2008 has brought 
TILA's emphasis on disclosure to the forefront of policymaking. 14 This is because a significant 
cause of the mortgage crisis is considered to be the issuance of loans to borrowers who simply 
did not understand the terms of the loans they were taking on. 15 Thus, disclosure requirements 
are seen as an essential tool to protect consumers from abusive practices by the lending industry 
and to avoid another mortgage bubble. 16 
9 McOmie-Gray v. Bank of America Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1326 (9th Cir. Feb. 8, 2012); 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f). 
10 McOmie-Gray, 667 F.3d at 1326; 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a); 15 U.S.C. § 1635(t) (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(2). 
11 McOmie-Gray, 667 F.3d at 1326. 
12 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq.(2006). 
13 15 U.S.C. 1601(a) § (2006) ("It is the purpose of this title to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that 
the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the 
uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card 
practices."); see also Chase Bank USA, NA v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 874-75 (2011) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 160l{a)) 
("Congress passed TILA to promote consumers' 'informed use of credit' by requiring 'meaningful disclosure of 
credit terms'"). 
14 Les Christie, Foreclosures up a record 81% in 2008, CNN MONEY (Jan. 15,2009, 3:48AM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2009/0 I /15/real_ estate/millions_ in _foreclosure/index.htm; Jeff Sovem, Preventing Future 
Economic Crises Through Consumer Protection Law or How the Truth in Lending Act Failed the Subprime 
Borrowers, 71 OHJO ST.L.J. 761 (2010). 
15 Richard Gaudon, UNDERSTANDING THE MORTGAGE MELTDOWN WHAT HAPPENED AND WHO'S TO BLAME, 
http://www .moneymatters1 0 1.com/mortgage/meltdown.asp; 
16 LEARN ABOUT THE BUREAU, http://www.consumerfmance.gov/the-bureau/ ("An informed consumer is the frrst 
line of defense against abusive practices."). 
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In addition to mandating disclosure requirements, TILA also provides an important 
substantive right for the consumers who do not receive adequate disclosures, for loans secured 
by a principal dwelling: the right to rescind the transaction.17 As foreclosure filings increased 
during the financial crisis of 2008, the number of rescission cases also increased. 18 Rescission 
has become an effective tool for borrowers seeking to protect their homes against lenders who, in 
the lead-up to the fmancial crisis, engaged in abusive or deceptive credit practices by failing to 
provide required disclosure forms. 19 For borrowers who have taken on loans they cannot repay 
due to inadequate lender disclosures, rescission is often the most powerful, and sometimes the 
sole, remedy ?0 
TILA provides a general three-day period for a borrower to rescind the transaction, which 
is exercised by notifying the lender - when rescission is exercised within this three-day period, it 
is known as "buyer's remorse" rescission. 21 If required disclosures are never provided, under 15 
U.S. C.§ 1635(f) (hereinafter"§ 1635(f)") the right of rescission extends to three years after the 
close of the transaction or sale of the property.22 While it is clear that a borrower must simply 
notify the lender to exercise the three-day buyer's remorse rescission, the method of exercising 
rescission during the extended three-year rescission period under§ 1635(f) is less clear because 
that specific subsection of the statute is silent as to the method of exercising rescission. 23 The 
Supreme Court has not provided any guidance on this issue. In Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, the 
17 15 u.s.c. § 1635. 
18 Carter Dougherty, Banks Push Fed to Curb Borrowers' Right to Rescind Mortgages, BLOOMBERG.COM (Dec. 16, 
2010 12:01 am), available at http://www .bloomberg.com/news/20 1 0-12-16/fed-mortgage-recission-plan-sparks-
fight-between-Ienders-consumer-groups.html (citing an estimate from Kathleen Day, spokeswoman for the Center 
for Responsible Lending, estimating "thousands" of rescission cases pending due to the economic crisis). 
19 Editorial, The Fed and Foreclosures, THE NEW YORK TIMES, (November 29, 2010), available at 
http://www .nytimes.com/20 1 O/ll/29/opinion/29mon2.html. 
20 Jd. (describing rescission as "the most effective legal tool that borrowers have to fight foreclosures."). 
21 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a); Jacob Werrett, Achieving Meaningful Mortgage Reform, 42 CoNN. L. REv. 319, 337 (2009). 
22 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (2006). 
23 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f). The accompanying regulation states that a borrower exercises rescission the same way under 
§ 1635(t) as under§ 1635(a), but this has not been enough to allay the confusion among the circuits. See e.g., 
McOmie-Gray v. Bank of America Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. Feb. 8, 2012). 
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Court described§ 1635(f)'s as a strict bar on claims filed outside the three year period, but the 
Court did not address the actual method of properly exercising rescission within the three-year 
. d 24 peno. 
While the statute, 25 accompanying regulation, 26 and even the model disclosure forms27 all 
suggest that a borrower exercises rescission by notifying the lender, a dispute has developed 
among the circuits concerning how exactly the consumer may satisfy the extended three year 
limit for exercising rescission. Many courts have correctly concluded that a consumer satisfies 
the time limit by notifying the lender of rescission in accordance with the statute and regulations. 
These courts have found that, as the statutory and regulatory language indicates,§ 1635(f) only 
limits a borrower's right to assert rescission, and does not contain a filing requirement. 28 
However, the majority of courts, often relying upon the Supreme Court's decision in Beach, have 
read into the statute that a borrower must also file a lawsuit within three years to avoid 
extinguishment of the rescission right.29 Ms. McOmie-Gray's story is typical of the situation 
many borrowers have found themselves in following the recent trend by the Courts of Appeals 
reading a filing requirement into the statute. Instead of rescission remaining a powerful remedial 
tool for borrowers to use without judicial intervention, 30 these courts have unfortunately shifted 
the power of rescission into the hands of the banks that can, as they did to Ms. McOmie-Gray, 
24 Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410 (1998); See discussion infra Part III.B. 
25 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a), (f). 
26 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(2) (2011). 
27 12 C.F.R. § 226, app. H-8 (2011). 
28 See e.g., Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. N.C. 2012); In re Hunter, 400 B.R. 651 
(Bankr. N.D. llJ. 2009); Barnes v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, No. 11-cv-142, 2011 WL 4950111 10 (D. Or. Oct. 18, 
2011); Johnson v. Long Beach Mortg. Loan Trust, 451 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2006)). 
29 See e.g., Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172 (lOth Cir. Colo. 2012); McOmie-Gray v. Bank of 
America Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. Feb. 8, 2012); Williams v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 410 Fed. 
Appx. 495 (3d Cir. Pa. 2011); Geraghty v. BAC Home Loans Serv. LP, No. 11-336,2011 WL 3920248 (D. Minn. 
Sept. 7, 2011); Bradford v. HSBC Mortg. Corp., 799 F. Supp. 2d 625 (E.D. Va. 2011); DeCosta v. U.S. Bancorp, 
No. 10-0301, 2010 WL 3824224 (D. Md. Sept. 27, 2010)). 
30 Belini v. Washington Mut. Bank, FA, 412 F.3d 17,25 (1st Cir. 2005) ("[S]ection 1635 is written with the goal of 
making the rescission process a private one, worked out between creditor and debtor without the intervention of the 
courts."). 
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stonewall until the statutory time period expires even after the borrower makes the intent to 
rescind clear. 
This comment addresses the unresolved circuit split over what a borrower must do to 
satisfy the three year time limitation for rescission under TILA. Part II provides an overview of 
TILA and the history of its passage, and details the statutory mechanism for rescission under 
TILA and the accompanying regulations. Part III describes the recent circuit split regarding 
TILA' s rescission requirements and provides summaries of the reasoning in the most recent 
Courts of Appeals decisions. In Part IV, this Comment argues for an interpretation of §1635(f) 
that will protect borrowers without overburdening lenders. This Comment concludes that § 
1635(f) and its accompanying regulation must be read plainly, to only require borrowers to 
notify the lender to exercise rescission, and proposes solutions to effect that outcome uniformly 
throughout the circuits. Courts that have read a filing requirement into the statute have misread 
the statute, misinterpreted Supreme Court precedent, and misunderstood important policy 
implications. 
II. Overview of Rescission under the Truth In Lending Act 
This section provides a brief background of the Truth in Lending Act and contextualizes its 
passage and major subsequent amendments. After contextualizing TILA, this section then 
provides of overview of the rescission remedy provided by the statute. This overview includes a 
detailing of the statutory rescission procedure as well as an explanation of the actual legal effect 
of rescission. 
A. Background of the Truth In Lending Act 
5 
In 1968 President Johnson signed the Consumer Credit Protection Act, which included 
the Truth In Lending Act (TILA).31 TILA was passed as one of the later legislative 
achievements of President Johnson's Great Society agenda, and its passage is now considered to 
be the "birth of modem consumer legislative activism."32 By its own terms, the goal ofTILA is 
to assure meaningful disclosures of credit terms in consumer credit transactions. 33 The purpose 
of this goal is twofold: so that consumers may avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to protect 
consumers from inaccurate and unfair practices related to credit. 34 In passing TILA, Congress 
believed that a meaningful disclosure of credit terms would also promote economic stability and 
competition. 35 
In addition to the stated goals of TILA, the legislation has always been understood as a 
remedial consumer protection statute. 36 Courts agree that TILA is a remedial statute because of 
its clear purpose to protect consumers against the uninformed use of credit offered by potentially 
deceptive creditors.37 Given TILA's remedial nature, courts have also agreed that the statute 
should be interpreted liberally to protect consumers. 38 TILA' s grant of the powerful right of 
31 Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146, 146 (1968) (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et 
seq. (2012)); THOMPSON & RENUART, TRUTH IN LENDING, Vol. 1, § 1.2.1, at 4 (7th ed. 2010). 
32 Thompson & Renuart, supra note 31 , at 5. 
33 15 U.S.C. § 160l(a) (2006). 
34 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a). The language pertaining to protecting consumers from unfair and inaccurate credit practices 
was added by Congress in a 1974 amendment. P.L. 93-495 (Oct. 28, 1974), Title III,§ 302; 88 Stat. 1511. 
35 15 U.S.C. § 160l(a). 
36 See infra note 26 (describing the passage ofTILA as "birth of modem consumer legislative activism.") 
37 See Littlefield v. Walt Flanagan & Co., 498 F.2d 1133, 1136 (lOth Cir. 1974) (quoting N.C. Freed Co. v. Bd. of 
Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 473 F.2d 1210, 1214 (2d Cir. 1973)) ("The Act ... designed to prevent 
'unscrupulous and predatory creditor practices' ... is remedial"); Begala v. PNC Bank, N.A., 163 F.3d 948, 950 (6th 
Cir. Ohio 1998) ("We have repeatedly stated that TILA is a remedial statute."); Smith v. No.2 Galesburg Crown 
Finance Corp., 615 F.2d 407,415 (7th Cir. Ill. 1980) (fmding that TILA action survives as remedial claim, and 
recognizing that "courts have tended to emphasize the remedial character of the statute."). 
38 See Bragg v. Bill Heard Chevrolet, Inc., 374 F.3d 1060, 1065 (I 1th Cir. 2004) ("As a remedial statute, TILA must 
be construed liberally in favor of the consumer."); Beg a/a, 163 F .3d at 950 ("We have repeatedly stated that TILA is 
a remedial statute and, therefore, should be given a broad, liberal construction in favor of the consumer."); King v. 
California, 784 F.2d 910,915 (9th Cir. Cal. 1986) (citation omitted) ("The courts have construed TILA as a remedial 
statute, interpreting it liberally for the consumer."); James v. Home Constr. Co., 621 F.2d 727, 729 (5th Cir. Ala. 
1980) (citation omitted)(" ... the Truth-in-Lending Act, a remedial act, has usually been given a broad liberal 
interpretation since it is assumed that was the intent of Congress"). 
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rescission to borrowers for certain loans that violate TILA's requirements is symbolic of the 
consumer-oriented intent of Congress that has also been recognized by the courts. 39 
TILA promotes its goals primarily by mandating disclosure requirements for various 
types of credit transactions. TILA contains disclosure requirements for open-end credit loans40 
( defmed as "plan[ s] under which the creditor reasonably contemplates repeated transactions, 
which prescribes the terms of such transactions, and which provides for a finance charge which 
may be computed from time to time on the outstanding unpaid balance"41 ) as well as closed-end 
credit loans,42 which are defined as credit loans that are not open-end, such as mortgages.43 For 
closed-end transactions such as mortgages, TILA requires disclosure of the identity of the 
creditor, the amount financed, the finance charge, APR, and more.44 To give force to these 
disclosure requirements, TILA provides consumers with a powerful substantive right: the right to 
rescind certain loan transactions, which arises when a lender fails to provide the mandated 
disclosures. 45 This right applies to any consumer credit transaction secured by a principal 
dwelling, 46 except for residential mortgage transactions. 47 
TILA has faced numerous amendments and revisions in its over thirty-year history.48 
The frrst amendment affecting rescission rights occurred in 1974.49 While the extended 
39 15 U.S.C § 1635 (2006); See THOMAS & RENUART, supra note 31, § 1.2.1, at 5; see infra notes 37, 38. 
40 15 U.S.C. § 1637 (2006). 
41 15 U.S.C. § 1602(j) (2006). 
42 15 u.s.c. § 1638 (2006). 
43 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(10) (2011); King v. California, 784 F.2d 910, 913 (9th Cir. Cal. 1986) ("[t]he transaction here 
would qualify .as closed-end, because it does not fit any of the defmitions of an open-end credit transaction"). 
44 15 u.s.c. § 1638. 
45 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (2006). 
46 15 U.S.C. § 1635. The statute does not defme "principal dwelling." The official staff interpretations published by 
the Federal Reserve Board contain some guidance, however. 12 C.F.R. § 226, Supp. I at 226.23(a)(l )(1997) ("A 
consumer can only have one principal dwelling at a time ... A vacation or other second home would not be a 
principal dwelling."). 
47 12 C.F.R. 226.23(f)(l) (2011). A "residential mortgage transaction" is defmed as a "transaction in which a 
mortgage ... is created or retained against the consumer's dwelling to fmance the acquisition or initial 
construction of such dwelling." 15 U.S.C. § 1602(w) (2006). Thus, general1y, the rescission right applies to 
refmancing loans and home improvement loans with respect to a borrower's principal dwelling. 
48 For an overview of all of the amendments to TILA, see THOMPSON & RENUART, supra note 31, § 1.2.1. 
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rescission right was initially open-ended once triggered, Congress, in response to complaints 
from the lending industry, amended the statute to add a three year time limit for rescission-§ 
1635(f). 50 Another amendment affecting rescission occurred in 1980, when Congress tweaked 
the statute to limit rescission rights to loans secured by a "principal dwelling," as opposed to a 
"residence. " 51 Despite these minor limitations on the rescission right, TILA remained a 
significant source of borrower's rights after the early amendments. 52 
During the early 1990s, TILA' s rescission requirement became an important consumer 
defense against the possibility of foreclosure. 53 Home equity borrowing had increased and had 
·become a primary credit tool. 54 As a result of the mass securitization of homes, the homes of 
many borrowers became exposed to fmancial risk and rescission became a vital tool for 
consumer protection. 55 In addition, the credit industry still had complaints concerning the law, 
especially after an Eleventh Circuit, Rodash v. AlB Mortgage Co., decision interpreted TILA's 
disclosure requirements in a way that exposed many existing mortgages to rescission. 56 
Subsequently, Congress passed The Truth in Lending Act Amendments of 1995 (the 1995 
49 Fair Credit Billing Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, Title IV,§§ 404,405,412,88 Stat. 1517, 1519 (1974). 
50 Jamerson v. Miles, 421 F. Supp. 107, 110, (N.D. Tex. 1976) ("The open-ended nature of the rescission right, 
however, ended on October 28, 1974, when Congress amended section 1635 to include a new subsection (f), which 
imposed a three-year limitation on the right to rescind."). 
51 Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 612,94 Stat. 132 (1980). 
52 THOMPSON & RENUART, supra note 31, § 1 .2.2 at 7. 
53 Id § 1.2.5 at 8. 
54 !d. (citing NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, THE COST OF CREDIT: REGULATION, PREEMPTION, AND INDUSTRY 
ABUSES§ 2.4 (4th ed. 2009 and Supp.) (discussing the deregulation of the residential mortgage market). 
55 THOMPSON & RENUART, supra note 31, § I .2.5 at 8. A number of questionable creditor practices also contributed 
to a proliferation of TILA violations. For instance, some creditors "unbundled" the costs of originating loans, and 
instead passed the costs onto consumers piece-by-piece without disclosing these costs at the initial transaction. Jd 
For a discussion of other creditor practices that result in widespread TILA violations and created an impetus behind 
the I 995 amendments, see id. 
56 Rodash v. Am Mortgage Co., 16 F.3d 1142 (11th Cir. Fla. 1994). In Rodash, the court ruled that "intangible 
taxes" were "fmance charges" under TILA -a categorization that made these charges a disclosure requirement. 
This decision resulted in some borrowers rushing to refmance their loans into rescindable mortgage transactions 
because most creditors did not quickly update their disclosure terms to reflect the Rodash decision. THOMPSON & 
RENUART, supra note 31, § 1.2.5 at 8-9. 
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Amendments). 57 The 1995 Amendments tweaked the disclosure requirements and provided 
retroactive immunity for certain loans exposed to rescission by the Rodash decision. 58 
Importantly for the right to rescind, the 1995 Amendments created special rules for rescission 
claims raised as a defense in foreclosure. 59 In particular, some of the retroactive immunity 
granted by the law did not apply to these rescission claims, and the tolerance level for disclosure 
violations was made much lower for these claims. 6° Congress's decision to provide special 
treatment to rescission claims raised in foreclosure and to retain rescission as a powerful 
consumer remedy ensured the importance of rescission as a remedy for borrowers who did not 
receive proper disclosure forms. 61 
Subsequent amendments related primarily to the disclosure requirements and had no 
effect on the rescission remedy.62 Nonetheless, the trend of these amendments was in line with 
the purpose of TILA - to protect consumers. For instance, in an otherwise pro-creditor63 
bankruptcy amendment package in 2005, some disclosure requirements were heightened for 
certain transactions. 64 
57 Truth in Lending Act Amendments of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-29, 109 Stat. 271 (1995); THOMPSON & RENUART, 
supra note 31 , § 1.2.5 at 8. 
58 Truth in Lending Act Amendments of 1995, §§ 2, 4. 
59 ld. § 8. 
60 I d. The 1995 Amendments also limited rescission in foreclosure to only certain disclosure violations. 
61 THOMPSON & RENUART, supra note 31, § 1.2.5 at 9 ("(T]he retention of the rescission remedy and the relatively 
low tolerance for defensive claims re-emphasized the particular important of TILA in providing a remedy for 
borrowers in foreclosure."). 
62 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, §§ 1301-1309, 119 Stat 
23 (2005); Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-315, 122 Stat. 3078 (2008); Housing and 
Economic Recovery Act of2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, §§ 2502(a), 122 Stat. 2654 (2008) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
1638(b )(2)); The Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, 123 Stat.1632 (2009). 
63 See Timothy Egan, Newly Bankrupt Raking in Piles of Credit Offers, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 1 1, 2005), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/ll/national/11credit.html?_r=O. 
64 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, §§ 1301-1309, 119 Stat 
23 (2005). 
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Though the 1995 Amendments were considered in some aspects to be creditor-friendly,65 
the 2008 fmancial crisis provided the impetus for further amendments to TILA intended to 
protect consumers. 66 The crisis was fueled by a mortgage industry collapse caused in large part 
by the mass issuance of loans to borrowers who could not afford them. 67 TILA' s rescission right 
became increasingly important as foreclosure filings increased.68 Perhaps in response to 
criticism that TILA's inadequate disclosure requirements were a cause of the mortgage crisis,69 
Congress once again acted to protect consumers by amending TILA. 7° For instance, Congress 
provided further protection to borrowers by requiring early disclosures of credit terms for loans 
secured by a principal dwelling. 71 Congress also provided a safe-harbor for loan servicers from 
TILA violations to encourage loan modifications in lieu of foreclosure. 72 And most importantly, 
an amendment in 201 0 created and transferred rule-making authority for implementing TILA to 
an agency with a decidedly more consumer-oriented approach.73 Originally, rulemaking 
65 THOMPSON & RENUART, supra note 31, § 1.2.5 at 9 ("[T]he 1995 amendments provided some additional leeway 
to creditors in making certain TIL disclosures."). The credit-friendly nature of the 1995 amendments should not be 
overstated, however, considering that rescission remained a powerfuJ remedy and rescission cJaims raised in 
foreclosure, though limited to only certain disclosure violations, were provided with lower tolerance for disclosure 
violations compared to other claims. See infra note 61. 
66 See Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat 1734 
(2009); Higher Education Opportunity Act, Pub. L. 110-315, § 1101, 122 Stat 3078 (2008); Housing and Economic 
Recovery Act of2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, §§ 2502(a), 122 Stat. 2654 (2008) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
1638(b)(2)); Prevent Mortgage Foreclosure and Enhance Mortgage Credit Availability, Pub. L. No. 111-22, § 201, 
123 Stat 1632 (2009); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 
1100A, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
67 See Sovem, Help for the Perplexed Home Buyer supra note 2. 
68 Dougherty, supra note 18 (citing an estimate from Kathleen Day, spokeswoman for the Center for Responsible 
Lending, estimating "thousands" of rescission cases pending due to the economic crisis). 
69 Sovem, supra note 14. 
70 See infra note 66. 
71 Housing and Economic Recovery Act of2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, §§ 2502(a), 122 Stat. 2654 (2008) (to be 
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1638(b)(2)). 
72 Prevent Mortgage Foreclosure and Enhance Mortgage Credit Availability, Pub. L. No. 111-22, § 201, 123 Stat 
1632 (2009). 
73 Dougherty, supra note 18 ("Since the fmancial crisis began, the Fed has come under criticism for having failed to 
meet its existing legal mandate to protect consumers from deceptive mortgages and other financial products. That 
track record was one reason behind Congress's push to create an independent consumer agency."). 
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authority to implement TILA had been granted to the Federal Reserve Board.74 However, in 
201 0 a Congress interested in expanding consumer protection transferred rulemaking authority to 
the newly-created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act. 75 In an early exercise of rulemaking authority, the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has proposed new disclosure guidelines to provide 
borrowers with simplified information regarding credit terms. 76 
B. Rescission under TILA 
Since its inception, TILA has included a substantive right of rescission for the borrowers 
whose loans are secured by principal dwellings. 77 This right only applies to loans that are not 
residential mortgage transactions, 78 which are secured loans used to finance the acquisition of 
property or the initial construction of property. 79 Thus, the rescission right applies most often to 
loans that are refinancing arrangements on principal dwellings, and loans that are given to 
finance remodeling efforts on principal dwellings. This section provides a brief overview of this 
rescission process and the legal effect of rescission. 
1. The Rescission Process 
For the transactions to which the rescission remedy is available, the law requires lenders, 
as an additional disclosure requirement, to disclosure the existence of a security agreement, the 
borrower's general right to rescind, the method of rescission with a form provided, the effect of 
74 Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 105, 82 Stat. 148 (1968). 
75 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1 1 OOA, 124 Stat. 1376 
(2010); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (2006) (current statute granting TILA rulemaking authority to the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau); THOMPSON & RENUART, supra note 31, § 1.2.11, at 11. 
76 See CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU PROPOSES "KNOW BEFORE YOU OWE" MORTGAGE FORMS, 
http://www.consumerfmance.gov/pressreleases/consumer-fmancial-protection-bureau-proposes-know-before-you-
owe-mortgage-forms/; see also Sovem, Help for the Perplexed Home Buyer supra note 2. 
77 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (2006). See infra note 46 for information regarding the defmition of"principa1 dwe11ing." 
78 See infra note 4 7. 
79 15 U.S.C. § 1602(w) (2006). 
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rescission, and the date on which rescission expires. 80 To help implement TILA, Congress 
originally granted rulemaking authority to the Federal Reserve Board, which promulgated 
influential regulations known as "Regulation Z. "81 The regulations provide a sample disclosure 
form that serves as a guideline to lenders. 82 
Figure 1: Sample Notice of Right to Cancel, Regulation Z83 
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO CANCEL 
Your Right to Cancel 
You are entering into a transaction that will result in a [mortgage/lien/ security interest] [on/in] 
your home. You have a legal right under federal law to cancel this transaction, without cost, within 
three business days from whichever of the following events occurs last: 
(1) the date of the transaction, which is ____ ; or 
(2) the date you received your Truth in Lending disclosures; or 
(3) the date you received this notice of your right to cancel. 
If you cancel the transaction, the [mortgage/lien/security interest] is also cancelled. Within 20 
calendar days after we receive your notice, we must take the steps necessary to reflect the fact that 
the [mortgage/lien/security interest] [on/in] your home has been cancelled, and we must return to 
you any money or property you have given to us or to anyone else in connection with this 
transaction. 
You may keep any money or property we have given you until we have done the things mentioned 
above, but you must then offer to return the money or property. If it is impractical or unfair for 
you to return the property, you must offer its reasonable value. You may offer to return the 
property at your home or at the location of the property. Money must be returned to the address 
below. If we do not take possession of the money or property within 20 calendar days of your 
offer, you may keep it without further obligation. 
How to Cancel 
If you decide to cancel this transaction, you may do so by notifying us in writing, at 
80 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2006); 12 § C.F.R. 226.23(b)(l) (2011). 
81 Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. 90-321, Title I, Ch 1, § 105,82 Stat. 148 (May 29, 1968); 12 C.F.R. §§ 
226 et seq. Congress has since transferred rulemaking authority to the more consumer-oriented Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau. infra note 75. 
82 See infra Figure 1. 
83 12 C.F.R. § 226, app. H-8 (2011) (emphasis added). 
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(creditor's name and business address). 
You may use any written statement that is signed and dated by you and states your intention to 
cancel, or you may use this notice by dating and signing below. Keep one copy of this notice 
because it contains important infonnation about your rights. 
If you cancel by mail or telegram, you must send the notice no later than midnight of (date) (or 
midnight of the third business day following the latest of the three events listed above). If you 
send or deJiver your written notice to cancel some other way, it must be delivered to the above 
address no later than that time. 
I WISH TO CANCEL 
Consumer's Signature Date 
Delivery of the rescission notice, along with other disclosure forms, is only the first step in the 
TILA rescission process. The law provides a three day window for the borrower to rescind the 
transaction84 - the so-called "buyer's remorse" rescission provision.85 This three day window 
begins at either the close of the transaction or delivery of the required disclosure forms, 
whichever comes later.86 In the event that the required disclosure forms are never provided, the 
borrower's window to exercise the right to rescind is extended for three years under§ 1635(±).87 
This extension begins at either the close of the transaction or the sale of the property, whichever 
occurs first. 88 
To exercise rescission during the three-day buyer's remorse window, the statute is clear 
that the borrower may rescind the transaction by "notifying the creditor, in accordance with 
regulations of the Bureau, of his intention to do so."89 The regulation requires borrowers to 
84 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a). 
85 Jacob Werrett, Achieving Meaningful Mortgage Reform, 42 CONN. L. REv. 319, 337 (2009). 
86 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a). 
87 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f). 
88 I d. The sample notice of right to rescind does not specifically include information regarding this extended right to 
rescind. See Figure 1. 
89 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a). 
13 
"notify the creditor of the rescission by mail, telegram or other means of written 
communication. "90 Thus, courts agree that notification is sufficient to exercise rescission under 
the buyer's remorse provision.91 Under§ 1635(f)'s three-year time extension, in contrast, the 
manner in which a borrower must exercise the right to rescind is not specifically described. 92 
Nor does§ 1635(f) contain a requirement that the borrower file a lawsuit to exercise the right.93 
Moreover, Regulation Z's admonishment that rescission is exercised by notifying the creditor of 
rescission does not specify that it refers to buyer's remorse rescission, § 1635(f) rescission, or 
both. 94 Courts disagree over whether a borrower must simply notify a lender to satisfy § 
1635(f)'s time limitation, or whether a borrower must also file a lawsuit within the three year 
period to preserve the rescission right. 95 
The actual rescission process, once properly exercised by a borrower, is governed by § 
163 5(b) and its implementing regulation. 96 After the borrower exercises the right to rescind, the 
lender is obligated to, within twenty days, return any money or property that was provided by the 
borrower back to the borrower.97 Thus, the onus is on the lender to cancel the security interest. 
Only then is the borrower required to tender the money given in return for the security interest 
90 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(2) (2011). 
91 See e.g., Aquino v. Pub. Fin. Consumer Disc. Co., 606 F. Supp. 504, 507-08 (E.D. Pa. 1985) ("Section 1635(a) 
only requires the obligor to notify the creditor of his or her intention to rescind in accordance with regulations 
promulgated by the Board . . . If Congress had wished either to place an additional burden on the obligor or to grant 
the creditor additional time to respond to this type of rescission notice, it would have done so."). 
92 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1635(t) (2006) (silent on method of rescission) with 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (rescission 
exercised by "notifying the creditor, in accordance with regulations of the Bureau, of his intention to do so."). 
93 /d. 
94 Id. For an argument that this regulation refers to exercising rescission under both the buyer's remorse provision 
and§ 1635(f), see infra Part IV.C. 
95 See discussion infra III.C. 
96 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2006), 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d) (2011). The 1995 TILA amendments created special rules 
regarding rescission raised as a shield against foreclosure. THOMPSON & R.ENUART, supra note 31 § 1.2.5 at 9; see 
also infra Part ll.A. These rules limit rescission after foreclosure to one of two disclosure failures: (1) when the 
mortgage broker fee is not included in the fmance charge disclosure, and (2) when the required rescission rights 
disclosure forms are not provided. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(i) (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23{h) (2011). 
97 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (Lender must within twenty days "return to the obligor any money or property given as 
earnest money, downpayment, or otherwise, and ... take any action necessary or appropriate to reflect the 
termination of any security interest created under the transaction."). 
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or, if preferable and reasonable, the property to the lender, in return for cancellation of the 
security interest. 98 The aim of this process is to return each party - the borrower and lender - to 
the status quo before the transaction was consummated. 99 
While Regulation Z states that this procedure may be modified by court order, 100 there is 
no suggestion that a court must oversee this process, which has been characterized as a private 
non-judicial procedure. 101 Indeed, this process has been described as enhancing common law 
rescission to provide more protection for consumers in the specific context of mortgages. 102 
Practically speaking, rescission is often used by borrowers facing foreclosure to force a 
loan modification involving an entirely new lender. 103 The original lender is required to return 
interest and fees to the consumer, and a second lender pays the principal due to the first lender 
while negotiating a new loan with the borrower. 104 The end result is protecting borrowers from 
being foreclosed upon on the basis of illegal loans, returning the lender to the status quo by 
98 12 C.F.R § 226.23(d). However, some courts have used their equitable power over the TILA rescission process 
to require a showing that the borrower has the ability to tender before granting rescission. See generally, Lea 
Krivinskas Shepard, It's All About the Principal: Preserving Consumers' Right of Rescission Under the Truth In 
Lending Act, 89 N.C.L. REv. 171 (2010). 
99 See McKenna v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., 475 F.3d 418,421 (1st Cir. Mass. 2007) ("Rescission 
essentially restores the status quo ante; the creditor terminates its security interest and returns any monies paid by 
the debtor in exchange for the latter's return of all disbursed funds or property interests."); Sosa v. Fite, 498 F.2d 
114, 119, 1974 (5th Cir. Tex. 1974) ("[S]ection 1635(b) is clearly designed to restore the parties as much as possible 
to the status quo ante."); Yamamoto v. Bank of N.Y., 329 F.3d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir. Haw. 2003) (quoting Quenzer v. 
Advanta Mortgage Corp. USA, 288 B.R. 884, 888 (D. Kan. 2003)) ("within the meaning of[TILA], 'rescission' does 
not mean an annulment that is defmitively accomplished by unilateral pronouncement, but rather a remedy that 
restores the status quo ante."); Bynum v. Equitable Mortg. Group, No. 99 CV 2266-SBC-JMF, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 6363, at *41 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2005) ("[§ 1635(b)] is clearly designed to restore the parties as much as 
possible to the status quo ante."). 
100 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d)(4). 
101 See Belini v. Washington Mut. Bank, F.A., 412 F.3d 1517,25 (1st Cir. 2005) (emphasis added) ("[S]ection 1635 
is written with the goal of making the rescission process a private one, worked out between creditor and debtor 
without the intervention of the courts."). 
102 See Shepard, supra note 98, at 188 ("TILA's rescission provisions shift significant leverage to consumers by 
enhancing the protections provided to consumers under common law causes of action and remedies."). 
103 Dougherty, supra note 18. 
104 I d. ("Borrowers usuaJly exercise the right of rescission during a foreclosure or other legal proceedings, 
effectively forcing a Joan modification. The borrower seeks a new lender, the original Jender returns interest and 
fees, and the principal is repaid by the second lender."). 
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having the principal repaid, and allowing the borrower to live in the home and make payments 
under a loan that complies with the law. 
In terms of damages, the law allows individuals to recover money damages for various 
TILA violations. 105 For instance, the lender can be subject to a cause of action seeking damages 
for failing to honor rescission. 106 TILA allows this by creating a right to costs and attorneys' 
fees for borrowers who are forced to file suit to have rescission properly effected. 107 The cause 
of action seeking damages for a TILA violation, such as failing to honor the rescission properly 
demanded by the borrower, must be brought within one year of the violation occurring. 108 
2. Effecting Rescission 
There is currently a dispute among the courts as to whether exercising the right to rescind 
in accordance with§ 1635(b) and the accompanying regulations effectively voids the transaction, 
or if it merely advances a claim for rescission that must be confirmed by a court.109 
This issue is important to note because some courts confuse the issue of effecting 
rescission with the issue of exercising the rescission right. 110 This Comment is only concerned 
with the latter issue. The language of the statute and Regulation Z suggest that the loan (and 
security interest) is automatically voided as a matter of law when the borrower exercises the 
rescission right, 111 and some courts have adopted this view. In affirming the borrower's right to 
105 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (2006). 
106 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (2006). 
101 Id. 
108 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (2006). 
109 Compare Lippner v. Deutsche Bank Nat'] Trust Co., 544 F. Supp. 2d 695 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (borrower entitled to 
rescission when lender failed to respond to rescission notice) and 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) ("(W]hen an obligor exercises 
his right to rescind under[§ 1635(a)], he is not liable for any fmance or other charge, and any security interest given 
by the obligor, including any such interest arising by operation of law, becomes void upon such a rescission.") with 
Large v. Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp., 292 F.3d 49, 54-55 (1st Cir. R.I. 2002) ("[T]he security interest becomes 
void when the obligor exercises a right to rescind that is available in the particular case, either because the creditor 
acknowledges that the right of rescission is available, or because the appropriate decision maker bas so 
determined."). 
110 See e.g., Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1187 (lOth Cir. Colo. 2012). 
111 See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2006), 12 C.F.R § 226.23(d)(1) (2011); see infra note 109. 
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rescind, for instance, the court in Lippner v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 112 allowed rescission 
as a remedy even after a judgment of foreclosure and sale was entered, because the borrower had 
demanded rescission earlier in a notice that was ignored by the lender. Under this approach, the 
lender can refuse to honor the rescission and seek a declaratory judgment. Other courts have 
found that a borrower who exercises rescission rights "has merely asserted a claim seeking 
rescission." 113 Under this view, rescission is not recognized by the law until either the lender 
honors it or it is confirmed by a court. 
The issue of effecting rescission is not the subject of this Comment and is mentioned in 
passing only as an issue that frequently appears in the cases. Moreover, the issue of when 
rescission is effected is sometimes confused with satisfying the temporal limitation under § 
1635(f), which is the subject of this Comment.114 For the purposes of exercising rescission with 
three years to satisfy§ 1635(f), the moment at which rescission is recognized by the law is 
irrelevant. Indeed, it is consistent for a court to hold that an exercise of rescission did not 
automatically void the transaction, but that it was timely under§ 1635(f).115 
III. 1976 to Beach: Early Case Law Developments Regarding Exercising Rescission 
Rights Under 1635 
Since § 1635(f) was enacted in 1976, two distinct issues of statutory interpretation arose 
in the courts. Some cases dealt with the issue of exercising rescission rights (hereinafter "the 
Exercising Rights cases") and other cases dealt with the nature of the time limitation under 
112 Lippner, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 702. 
113 Moore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A, 597 F. Supp. 2d 612, 616 (E.D. Va. 2009); see also, e.g., In re Merriman, 329 
B.R. 710, 719 (D. Kan. 2005) ("The plain language of the statute indicates that exercising the right to rescind is a 
discrete event; and rescission is a separate discrete event."); Yamamoto v. Bank ofNew York, 329 F.3d 1167 (9th 
Cir. 2003); American Mortgage Network, Inc. v. Shelton, 486 F.3d 815 (4th Cir. 2007). 
JJ
4 See e.g., Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1187; 
115 Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. N.C. 2012) ("We must not conflate the issue of 
whether a borrower has exercised her right to rescind with the issue of whether the rescission has, in fact, been 
completed and the contract voided. The former is the concern of§ 1635(t) and Regulation Z, and a borrower 
exercises her right of rescission by merely communicating in writing to her creditor her intention to rescind."). 
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§ 1635(£): whether it is a strict three year limitation or flexible ("Limitation cases"). Both lines of 
cases will be summarized in this section. Then, this section summarizes the Supreme Court case 
that is the definitive Limitation case- Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Banl!16 - which has been relied on 
improperly by many courts applying its holding to the Exercising Rights issue. 
A. Pre-Beach Cases Interpreting§ 1635(f) 
1. The Exercising Rights Cases 
There was never agreement among the courts as to the proper method of exercising 
rescission during the three year time window. Some of the ftrst courts to rule on this issue were 
in conflict. For example, in Clemmer v. Liberty Financial Planning, Inc.,117 the court found that 
the borrower exercised rescission by sending a rescission letter to the lender. However, in 
Jamerson v. Miles, 118 the court dismissed an action because the plaintiff failed to ftle an action 
seeking enforcement of rescission with three years.119 The proper method of exercising 
rescission has been a subject of dispute from the inception of§ 1635(f). 
In later cases, many courts seemed to coalesce around the argument that exercising 
rescission is accomplished for the purposes of§ 1635(f) by simply notifying the lender. For 
example, in In re Porter, 120 the court found that the borrower was entitled to rescission when she 
notified lender of rescission within three years of loan consummation. 121 Similarly, the court in 
Rowland v. Novus Fin. Corp. 122 allowed a TILA claim when the borrower asserted the right to 
116 523 u.s. 410 (1998). 
117 467 F. Supp. 272 (W.D.N.C. 1979). This case applied TILA as it existed before the§ 1635(t) time limitation was 
enacted. 
118 421 F. Supp. 107 (N.D. Tex. 1976). 
119 Jd at 111. 
120 961 F.2d 1066 (3d Cir. Pa. 1992). 
121 /d. at 1078 (emphasis added) ("[The bank]'s failure extended [the borrower's] time to request rescission to three 
years from the date of the 1987 loan ... Therefore her 1990 letter request to rescind was timely."). 
122 949 F. Supp. 1447, 1455 (D. Haw. 1996). 
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rescind within three years. 123 And in Rowland v. Magna Millikin Bank, NA., 124 the court found 
that the borrowers exercised rescission and effected rescission by letter to the lender within three 
years. Finally, the court in Stone v. Mehlberg, 125 found that the borrowers exercised rescission 
by notifying the lender by letter. 126 
Of course, some courts still held to the view that a borrower must file an action to satisfy 
§ 1635(£). For instance, the court in Smith v. Fidelity Consumer Disc. Co. 127 noted in dicta that a 
borrower has three years after consummation of a loan "within which to bring an action for 
rescission. " 128 In other cases, the issue did not arise because a lawsuit seeking rescission was 
filed within the three year window anyway or because the court declined to rule on the issue. 129 
In any event, these cases shows that there was confusion among the courts as to the method of 
exercising rescission under§ 1635(£) even before the Supreme Court decision in Beach. The 
Beach court did not resolve the issue contemplated by these cases, which has continued the 
confusion among the courts and has caused a recent Circuit split as rescission cases dramatically 
increased during the fmancial crisis of the 2000s. 130 
2. The Limitation Cases 
123 Id at 1455 ("Plaintiff asserted his right to rescind [within three years of consummation of the loan]. This notice 
of rescission was timely if, as Plaintiff alleges, Defendant did not provide the requisite notice of right to rescind or 
the material disclosures."). 
124 812 F. Supp. 875 (C.D. Ill. 1992). 
125 728 F. Supp. 1341 (W.D. Mich. 1989). 
126 Id at 134 7 (borrowers "properly exercised their right by informing the [lenders] of their intent to rescind by 
letter."). See also, e.g., McCoy v. Harriman Utility Bd., 790 F.2d 493 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1986) (holding that rescission 
claim survives because "Plaintiff mailed her notice of rescission ... within three years of all relevant dates"). 
127 898 F.2d 896, 903 (3d Cir. 1990). 
128/d 
129 See e.g., Dougherty v. Hoolihan, Neils, & Boland, 531 F. Supp. 717, 721-722 (D. Minn. 1982); Hefferman v. 
Bitton, 882 F.2d 379, 383-384 (9th Cir. Cal. 1989) (dec1ining to decide whether 1635(f) only requires notice). 
130 See discussion infra Parts III.B, IILC. 
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Another line of cases arose parallel to the Exercising Rights cases, dealing with the issue 
of the nature of§ 1635(f)'s three year time window. The split in these cases was resolved by the 
1998 Supreme Court decision in Beach. 131 
Some of the Limitation cases found that even outside the three year window, rescission 
could be raised as a defense to foreclosure. For example, in Dawe v. Merchants Mort g. & Trust 
Corp., the borrower attempted to demand rescission two years after the lender filed suit seeking 
judgment on the loan. 132 The court allowed the rescission claim to survive§ 1635(f)'s time 
limit, even though it was raised outside of the three year time window. 133 The court found that 
rescission raised as a defense in the nature of recoupment is not barred by § 163 5( f). 134 A 
number of other courts throughout the country reached a similar conclusion, characterizing 
rescission claims raised defensively in recoupment actions as exceptions to§ 1635(£). 135 These 
courts reasoned that an alternative reading of the statute would "would allow a creditor to wait 
three years to file its suit and thereby defeat the purpose of the Act."136 
Concurrently, other courts were holding that the rescission period is strict and that no 
claims asserted outside the three year period could survive. Some courts explicitly rejected a 
tolling theory for§ 1635(£), fmding it to be a strict statute that can not be tolled. 137 Other courts 
rejected the exception for rescission raised as a defense to recoupment, holding that a borrower 
"cannot revive a time-barred claim by characterizing his suit as a defense to an illegal claim 
131 See discussion infra Part lli.B . . 
132 683 P.2d 796 (Colo. 1984). 
133 !d. at 801. 
134 Id ("[P]etitioners' demand for rescission constitutes a defense in the nature of recoupment and is not barred by 
the limitations period set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f)."). 
135 See e.g., In re Barsky, 210 B.R. 683, 685 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997) ("holding that "rescission can be asserted 
defensively even if it is effected after the§ 1635(f) three-year period has run."); Westbank v. Maurer, 276 Ill. App. 
3d 553, 564 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1995) ("(B]ecause defendant raised her claim for rescission of the mortgage in 
response to plaintiff's foreclosure action, she was not barred by the three-year limitation contained in section 1635(f) 
of the Act."). 
136 Id 
137 E.g., 1n re Shaw, I 78 B.R. 380, 386 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1994) (tolling the statutory rescission period is improper 
because 1635(f) is a strict time limitation on asserting claims). 
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under the recoupment theory provided by the statute."138 These courts characterized§ 1635(f) as 
a strict repose period for the "right of rescission," but did not rule on whether notification of 
rescission within the repose period satisfies the statute. 139 
The split in the Limitation cases was resolved when the Supreme Court decided Beach. 140 
There, the Court endorsed the strict view of§ 1635(f)'s three year period but, just as the other 
courts in the Limitation line of cases, was silent as to the proper method of exercising 
• • 141 
reSCISSIOn. 
B. The Supreme Court's Decision in Beach v. Ocwen Fed Bank 
The major Supreme Court decision concerning § 1635(f) is Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank.142 
Beach was decided in 1998, after the 1995 TILA amendments. Beach continues to be the 
primary point of reference for courts interpreting§ 1635(±).143 
In Beach, the defendant borrowers had taken out a loan secured by their home in 1986, 
and stopped making payments in 1991.144 The bank initiated foreclosure proceedings in 1992, 
and the defendants raised rescission as a defense to that action, alleging various disclosure 
violations. 145 This rescission defense was raised well outside the three year time limitation 
imposed by§ 1635(f).146 The borrowers argued that§ 1635(f) only operated as a limitation on 
borrowers bringing rescission on their own, and did not bar defenses of rescission raised outside 
138 Moor v. Travelers Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 632, 634 (5th Cir. Miss. 1986) (internal quotation removed); Great W. Bank 
v. Shoemaker, 695 So. 2d 805, 807 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1997) (citation omitted) ("[S]ection 1635 'mirrors a 
statute of repose' and 'unambiguously expresses Congress's intent to extinguish the statutory right of rescission 
three years after the transaction's closing.'"). 
139 Beach v. Great W. Bank, 670 So. 2d 986, 993 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1996) affd 523 U.S. 410 (1998) 
(holding "that the statutory right of rescission under TILA expires three years after the closing of the transaction and 
may not be revived as a defense in recoupment in an action to collect the debt upon the buyer's default," but not 
ruling on how a borrower may properly assert rescission."). 
140 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
141/d 
142 523 u.s. 410 (1998). 
143 See discussion infra Part ill. C. 
144 Beach, 523 U.S. at413. 
145 /d. 
146 ld. 
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the three year window. 147 The borrowers argued this because, at the time, there was a circuit 
split concerning whether rescission raised as a defense is an exception to§ 1635(f)'s time 
limitation.148 As phrased by the court, the issue presented was "whether a borrower may assert 
this right to rescind as an affirmative defense in a collection action brought by the lender more 
than three years after the consummation of the transaction."149 In other words, the borrowers did 
not argue that anything they satisfied the three year time limit imposed by§ 1635(f)- instead, 
they argued that their defense should survive even though it was raised outside of the three year 
period. 150 
The Court in Beach began its analysis by noting that§ 1635(f) "says nothing in terms of 
bringing an action" and instead provides a time period for expiration of the right ofrescission. 151 
The court found that§ 1635(f) governs the life of the underlying right granted by the statute, and 
not of a lawsuit's commencement. 152 The Court then compared§ 1635(f)'s three year time 
limitation to the one year statute of limitations for actions arising out of TILA violations ("§ 
1640(e)"). 153 The Court noted that§ 1640(e) contains an exception for claims ofTILA 
violations raised as a defense in recoupment or set-off actions. 154 According to § 1640( e), claims 
for recoupment damages can be brought as a defense to any action with no statutory time 
limitation. 155 The Court found that this amounted to Congressional intent for separate treatment 
to apply to § 1635(f)'s time limitation, because§ 1635(f) contains no similar exception.156 The 
147 ld at415. 
148 Beach, 523 U.S. at 415; see discussion infra Part TII.A.2. 
149 Beach, 523 U.S. at 411-412. 
150 See Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271, 278 (4th Cir. N.C. 2012) ("The Beach Court did not 
address the proper method of exercising a right to rescind or the timely exercise of that right."). 
151 Beach, 523 U.S. at 417 (emphasis added). 
152/d 
153 Jd at 418; 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (2006). 
154 Beach, 523 U.S. at 418. 
155 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e). 
156 Beach, 523 U.S. at 418. 
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Court reasoned that allowing rescission claims to be raised perpetually as defenses in 
recoupment actions pursuant to § 1640( e) would "cloud the title" of mortgages during 
foreclosure. 157 The Court concluded that § 1635(f)'s three year time extension must be an 
absolute bar on rescission, raised defensively or otherwise, if asserted outside the three year 
period.158 
Thus, Beach stands for the proposition that § 163 5( f) is a strict three year limitation, and 
that even a defense of rescission raised after the three year period is precluded by the statute. 159 
Subsequent cases have interpreted this decision as holding§ 1635(f) to be a statute of repose, 
even though the Supreme Court never used that particular phrase in the Beach opinion. 160 The 
Court left open the exact method of exercising the rescission right within the three year statutory 
period - whether notice to the lender is sufficient, or if the filing of a lawsuit is an additional 
requirement. 161 Instead, the Beach court affirmatively rejected any claims raised outside the 
three year period. Thus, the Supreme Court addressed the nature of§ 1635(f)'s time limitation 
contemplated by the Limitation cases162 but did not resolve the confusion among the courts 
d . h E . . Ri h 163 expresse tnt e xerctstng g ts cases. 
C. The Post-Beach Circuit Split Concerning the Method of Exercising the Right to Rescind 
157 ld 
158 Id 
159 Id. 
160 See e.g., Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1181 (lOth Cir. Colo. 2012) (quoting Beach, 523 U.S. 
at 417) ("[T]he [Beach] Court ... held that [1635(t)] 'govem[s] the life of the underlying right [of rescission],' and 
is therefore not a statute of limitations, but one of repose."); Doss v. Clearwater Title Co., 551 F.3d 634, 638 (7th 
Cir. 2008); U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Manzo, 960 N.E.2d 1238, 1245 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 201 1) ("The Supreme 
Court ... found that the three-year deadline in section 1635(f) was not a statute of limitations but a statute of 
repose."); McOmie-Gray v. Bank of America Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 2012). 
Courts have also found that, as with all statutes of repose, equitable tolling is impossible. See e.g., Jones v. Saxon 
Mortg., 537 F.3d 320, 327 (4th Cir. Va. 1998) (citation omitted) ("Because§ 1635(f) is a statute of repose, the time 
period stated therein is typically not tolled for any reason."). 
161 See Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271, 278 (4th Cir. N.C. 2012) ("The Beach Court did not 
address the proper method of exercising a right to rescind or the timely exercise of that right."). 
162 See discussion infra Part III.A.2. 
163 See discussion infra Ili.A.l 
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As noted above, 164 the Supreme Court in Beach ruled defmitively that§ 1635(f) is a strict 
three year time limitation on the federal right to rescind- raised "defensively or otherwise."165 
However, the Court did not touch upon the question of how a borrower must exercise rescission 
within the three year time limit - instead, the Court was ruling on whether certain claims raised 
outside the three year period could survive, and held that they could not. 166 Thus, after Beach, 
the split among the lower courts concerning what a borrower must do to properly exercise 
rescission rights within the three year time window continued. Many cases properly allowed 
borrowers to satisfy§ 1635(f) by notifying the lender of intent to rescind in accordance with the 
statute's language and Regulation Z. 167 However, a majority of cases denied relief to borrowers 
who notified the lender of rescission within three years, if a lawsuit was not also filed within the 
three year period. 168 These courts generally improperly relied upon the Beach decision and 
applied it to the Exercising Rights issue, reading in an extra requirement (filing a lawsuit) that is 
not present in the statute or regulations. 169 Most recently, the issue of exercising rescission under 
TILA has been visited by the Third, Ninth, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits. 
164 See infra Part III.B. 
165 Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, at 418 (1998). 
166 Jd 
167 See e.g., Jozinovich v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. C09-03326, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3358, at *16, (N.D. 
CaL Jan. 14, 2010) (rescission permitted because notice of rescission was mailed within three years.); Jackson v. 
CIT Group, No. 06-543,2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78897, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2006); Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. 
Servs., No. 07-5040,2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137315, at *26-35 (E.D. Pa. May 7, 2010); In re Hunter, 400 B.R. 651 
(Bankr. N.D. 111. 2009); Barnes v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, No. 11-cv-142, 2011 WL 4950111 (D. Or. Oct. 18, 
2011); Johnson v. Long Beach Mortg. Loan Trust, 451 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2006). 
168 See e.g., Geraghty v. BAC Home Loans Serv. LP, No. 11-336,2011 WL 3920248 (D. Minn. Sept. 7, 2011); 
Bradford v. HSBC Mortg. Corp., 799 F. Supp. 2d 625 (E.D. Va. 2011); DeCosta v. U.S. Bancorp, No. 10-0301, 
2010 WL 3824224 (D. Md. Sept. 27, 2010); Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B. v. Carrington, No. 6:09-cv-2132-0r1-
31GJK, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17724, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2010); Falcocchia v. Saxon Mortg., Inc., 709 F. 
Supp. 2d 860, 868 (E.D. Cal. 2010) ("[P]laintiffs did not file a claim seeking rescission within the three year period . 
. . plaintiffs' allegation that they sent a notice of rescission within the three year period is irrelevant."); Ramos v. 
Citimortgage, Inc., No. CIV. 08-02250,2009 WL 86744 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2009) ("[B]ecause plaintiff filed his 
Complaint over three years from the date on which he consummated his loan, the court is without jurisdiction to 
consider his claim for rescission under TILA."). 
169 See e.g., Carrington, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *7 (citing Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, at 418 
(1998)) ("15 U.S.C. § 1635(t) operates to extinguish the right of rescission itself ... Thus no matter what actions 
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1. The Plain Reading Approach of the Fourth Circuit. 
The Fourth Circuit ruled on the proper method of exercising rescission rights to satisfy § 
1635(f) in Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC. 170 The Gilbert court did not find the Beach 
decision dispositive on the issue. 171 The court conducted a plain reading analysis of§ 1635(f) 
and concluded that all a borrower must due to satisfy§ 1635(f) is notify the lender of rescission 
within three years. 
In Gilbert, the Gilberts were foreclosed upon within three years of refinancing their 
mortgage. 172 After the foreclosure was initiated, but before the three year window had 
concluded, the borrowers had written to the lender alleging several TILA violations and 
notifying the lender of rescission. 173 The lender had responded with a refusal to honor the 
rescission. 174 While the Gilberts appealed the foreclosure decision, they filed a separate lawsuit 
seeking rescission. 175 This rescission lawsuit was filed outside of the three year window under 
§ 1635(f).176 Though the Gilberts were successful in their appeal of the foreclosure, the separate 
rescission action alleging TILA violations was dismissed by a lower court as untimely. 177 The 
Gilberts appealed the dismissal of the TILA claims, and the case eventually reached the 4th 
Circuit Court of Appeals. 178 
[Lender] took or failed to take, [Borrower]'s right to rescind was extinguished ... well before be filed the instant 
suit."); see discussion infra Part IV. 
170 678 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. N.C. 2012). 
171 !d. at 278 (noting that Beach did not address the issue of how a borrower may exercise the rescission right). 
172 Jd at 274. 
173 Id 
174 ld 
175 Gilbert, 678 F.3d at 274-275. 
176 ld 
177 Jd at 275. 
178 ld 
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The Gilberts based their appeal on the argument that they exercised the right to rescind 
within the three year window by sending the letter to the lender. 179 The court began its analysis 
by recognizing that nothing in the statute or Regulation Z says anything about requiring a 
borrower to file a lawsuit. 180 The court relied on the plain language of the statute and the 
regulation, which both suggest that notification is a proper and sufficient exercise of 
rescission. 181 The court also properly distinguished the issue of effecting rescission with 
exercising rescission- finding that TILA only requires a borrower to exercise the right of 
rescission within three years, not to effect it. 182 In addition, the court also properly distinguished 
Beach, finding that the Beach decision simply did not address the method of exercising the right 
of rescission. 183 Instead, the court noted that Beach addressed the extinguishment of the right of 
rescission after three years, a completely separate issue. 184 The court concluded that notification 
of rescission is a proper exercise of rescission rights under TILA and Regulation Z. 185 
The court then addressed the Gilberts' claim for damages. According to the court, refusal 
to honor rescission is a separate TILA violation and triggers the one year statute of limitations. 186 
Because the lawsuit seeking rescission was filed within one year of the Gilberts' letter seeking 
rescission, the court held that the Gilberts' could also seek damages for the refusal to honor the 
rescission, in addition to being entitled to rescission itself. 187 
2. The Tenth Circuit's Restrictive Approach: Concerned with Clouding the Title of 
Mortgages and Reliance on Beach. 
179 Id at 276. 
180 Id at 277. 
181 Gilbert, 678 F.3d at 277 (4th Cir. N.C. 2012); 15 U.S.C. § 1635(t) (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(2) (2011). 
182 Gilbert, 618 F.3d at 277; see discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
183 Id at 278. 
t84 Id 
185 ld 
186 /d.; 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (2006). 
187 Gilbert, 618 F.3d at 278-279. 
26 
While the Fourth Circuit in Gilbert properly distinguished Beach and found notification 
of rescission sufficient to satisfy § 163 5( f), the Tenth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion. In 
Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 188 the Tenth Circuit found Beach dispositive on the issue of how 
borrowers may exercise the rescission right, and read an additional implied requirement into the 
statute: that a borrower must not only notify the lender of rescission within three years, but must 
also file a lawsuit enforcing rescission with three years of the transaction. 
Ms. Rosenfield notified the lender that she intended to rescind the transaction about two 
years after they refinanced on their home. 189 She claimed that numerous disclosures were not 
made, including information on rescission rights, adjustable rates, and finance charges. 190 After 
Ms. Rosenfield defaulted, the lender sought to force a sale of the property by filing a motion with 
the trial court. 191 Ms. Rosenfield raised rescission as a defense to this proceeding- before the 
three year time window under§ 1635(f) had expired. 192 After a foreclosure sale was ordered, the 
Rosenfields commenced a separate action seeking, among other claims, a declaratory judgment 
deeming the loan rescinded. 193 
Ms. Rosenfield argued that she satisfied§ 1635(f)'s time limit when she notified the 
lender ofrescission. 194 The court rejected Ms. Rosenfield's argument on two grounds. First, the 
court found the Supreme Court decision in Beach to be "dispositive" of the question of 
188 681 F.3d 1172 (lOth Cir. Colo. 2012). 
189 !d. at 1175-1176. 
190 !d. at 1176. 
191 Id C.R.C.P. 120 provides an expedited judicial foreclosure proceeding, allowing a secured creditor to file a 
verified motion with a trial court to order the sale of the property. It is in this special proceeding that Ms. Rosenfield 
raised rescission as a defense. 
192 Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1176. This is a key factual distinction with Beach. In Beach, the borrower raised 
rescission as a defense after the three year window had expired. See Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, at 
413 (1998). The Tenth Circuit's reliance on Beach in this different context is demonstrative of the confusion 
between the issue of the nature of the three year time limitation - whether it is strict or can be tolled - and the issue 
of how to exercise the rescission right for the purpose of§ 1635(t). See Parts lll.A.l, ill.A.2. 
193 Rosenfield, 681 F.3d 1172, at 1176 (lOth Cir. Colo. 2012). 
194 Id at 1182. Ms. Rosenfield also argued that she satisfied the statute by raising rescission as a defense in the 
foreclosure proceeding, but that is not the subject of this comment. Nevertheless, the court rejected this argument as 
well. 
27 
exercising rescission. 195 The court described§ 1635(f)'s three year extension as a strict repose 
period that precludes satisfaction by merely notifying the lender of rescission. 196 As support for 
this, the court characterized the rescission right as one that can only be redressed "by invoking 
the power of the courts."197 On the other hand, the court noted in dicta that if the lender actually 
effectively responds to the rescission notice, then this may satisfy§ 1635(f)'s time limit without 
need for judicial intervention. 198 Thus, the court found that Ms. Rosenfield did not satisfy§ 
1635(f) because she did not file a lawsuit within three years, even though she notified the lender 
within the proscribed time period. 199 
The court also rejected Ms. Rosenfield's argument on contract principles.200 The court 
first compared TILA's rescission remedy to the common law rescission process.201 The court 
found the TILA rescission process to be analogous to common law rescission, and that the 
underlying purpose behind both is "remedial economy."202 The court reasoned that rescission is 
not appropriate, therefore, if enforcement is difficult under the circumstances. 203 The court 
concluded that allowing borrowers to exercise rescission by notifying lenders would complicate 
enforcement. 204 Specifically, the court was troubled by the prospect of a borrower notifying the 
195 Jd 
196/d 
197 ld at 1183. The Rosenfield court relied on case law concerning statutes of repose ruled upon in other contexts 
and upon the common understanding that a statute of repose bars claims - the filing of a lawsuit. I d at 1182-83. 
However, the Supreme Court in Beach never used the term "statute of repose" and there are other limitation statutes 
that limit the time for an assertion of a right without specifically referring to filing a lawsuit. See discussion infra 
Part IV.C. 
198 Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1183, n. 8 (lOth Cir. Colo. 2012). The contrast between the court's position that a court 
is necessary for an exercise of rescission by the borrower, and their assertion that a court is not necessary when a 
lender acknowledges rescission, is a clear example of the court's improper shifting of bargaining power away from 
the borrower and toward the lender. In essence, the court took a statute that was designed to provide borrowers with 
enhanced bargaining power, and flipped it around to strengthen the lender's position. Infra Part IV.B.3 
199 Rosenfield, 681 F .3d at 1188 ("[N]otice, by itself, is not sufficient to exercise (or preserve) a consumer's right of 
rescission under TILA. The commencement of a lawsuit with.in the three-year TILA repose period was required."). 
200 !d. at 1184-85. 
201 !d. at 1184. 
202 ld. 
203 Jd 
204 !d., 681 F.3d at 1185. 
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lender of rescission, but then waiting for some indeterminate time to seek judicial enforcement of 
the rescission- the court found that this possibility would "cloud a bank's title on foreclosure."205 
The court then contended with the plain meaning of the statute and the regulations?06 
The court found that the language of § 163 5 and Regulation Z does require borrowers to notify 
lenders of rescission, but that this was not sufficient to exercise the right. 207 Instead, with little 
analysis, the court found that notifying the lender is merely a predicate act to exercising the right 
of rescission, which is accomplished by filing a lawsuit. 208 The court, confusing exercising 
rescission rights with effecting rescission, concluded that allowing a borrower to unilaterally 
exercise the right to rescind would impermissibly enlarge the time period for rescission and 
would cloud the title of property indefinitely. 209 
3. The Third and Ninth Circuits' Reliance on Beach to Require Borrowers to File 
Lawsuit. 
The Third and Ninth Circuits have also recently ruled on the method of exercising 
rescission for the purposes of§ 1635, in Williams v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc. 210 and 
McOmie-Gray v. Bank of America Home Loans.211 Both courts reached the same restrictive 
outcome as the Rosenfield court, but produced less detailed opinions. In additio~ both courts 
found Beach dispositive in ruling that a borrower must file a lawsuit within three years to satisfy 
§ 1635. 
In Williams, a disabled and blind homeowner decided to remodel her home?12 Ms. 
Williams received a balloon loan secured by her home that was signed on November 22, 2004?13 
205 Rosenfield, at 1185, 1186 (quoting Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, at 418-419 (1998)). 
206 Id at 1185-1187. 
207 Id. at I I 85. 
208 Jd 
209 Jd at 1187. 
210 410 Fed. Appx. 495 (3d Cir. Pa. 2011). 
211 667 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. Feb. 8, 2012). 
212 Williams, 410 Fed. Appx. at 496. 
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In April2003, Ms. Williams was $20 short on a mortgage payment and the bank refused to 
accept the insufficient amount. 214 The bank obtained a default judgment in a foreclosure action 
by September of that year.215 After initiating a civil action and seeking bankruptcy protection in 
an attempt to save her home, Williams notified the lender of her intent to rescind the transaction 
based on TILA violations on November 22, 2004?16 The lender did not respond to this letter.217 
An action to enforce the rescission was not filed until August 22, 2006.218 
The borrowers argued that the three year limitation period is satisfied when rescission is 
exercised by notifying the lender.219 The court, with very little analysis, deferred to the Supreme 
Court's holding in Beach?20 The court found that the Supreme Court "implicitly recognized" 
that a claim for rescission must be filed with the court within the three-year period, in addition to 
notice to the lender.221 The court then concluded that a legal action enforcing rescission must be 
brought within three years. 222 
In McOmie-Gray, Ms. McOmie-Gray closed a first deed trust loan in 2006 and was 
provided with various disclosure documents to sign. 223 The lender failed to inform her of the 
date on which this right to rescind would expire, a key disclosure requirement. 224 Two years 
after the loan was consummated, Ms. McOmie-Gray sent a letter to the lender seeking to rescind 
the loan, but the bank refused rescission. 225 Instead, according to Ms. McOmie, the bank 
213 /d. 
214 /d. at 497. 
215 Id 
216/d 
217 ld 
218 Williams, 410 Fed. Appx. at 497. 
219 /d. at 498. 
220 Jd 
221 Jd at 499. 
222 /d. 
223 McOmie-Gray v. Bank of America Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1326 (9th Cir. 2012). 
224 Jd.; See infra Figure 1; 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(b)(l) (2011). 
225 McOmie-Gray, 667 F.3d at 1326-1327. 
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negotiated with her for over a year regarding the rescission. 226 After these negotiations failed, 
Ms. McOmie-Gray filed suit to rescind the loan, but by that point she filed outside of§ 1635(f)'s 
three year time period. 227 
The McOmie-Gray court's sparse analysis first addressed the legal effect of rescission 
under TILA. The court found that notifying the lender merely advances a claim for rescission, 
and that rescission is not automatic upon notification.228 The court then found Beach, as well as 
Ninth Circuit precedent establishing § 1635(f) as a statute of repose, dispositive, and rejected 
Ms. McOmie's claim?29 Ms. McOmie-Gray had argued that the lender's failure to honor the 
rescission notice extended the time period for seeking rescission by another year, but the court 
rejected this argument, relying on the Supreme Court's characterization of § 1635(f) as a strict 
limitation on the rescission right. 230 The court did not distinguish between deciding upon the 
legal effect of rescission on the loan agreement and the effect of exercising rescission for the 
purposes of§ 1635(±).231 Instead, the court seemed to hold that because notifying the lender does 
not completely effect rescission of the loan agreement, it is also not an exercise of the rescission 
right. 
IV. Borrowers Should be Able to Satisfy§ 1635(f)'s Three Year Time Limit on 
Rescission by Notifying the Lender of Rescission 
Courts should not read additional burdensome requirements for borrowers under TILA. 
The recent trend of courts requiring borrowers to file a lawsuit to satisfy§ 1635(f)' s three year 
limit for rescission is a prime example of judicial activism overriding the plan language of a 
226 ld at 1327. 
227 ld 
228 ld. 
229 Jd. at 1329. 
230 /d. 
231 McOmie-Gray, 667 F.3d at 1327-1329. The McOmie-Gray court did not seem to consider that the notification of 
rescission itself is what may satisfy§ 1635(t)'s time restriction. Instead, the court took it as a matter-of-course that 
Beach's holding requires borrowers to file lawsuits to exercise rescission, which is an incorrect reading of Beach. 
See discussion infra Parts III.B, IV.B.2. 
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statute even when in conflict with the statute's explicitly stated purpose. As the Fourth Circuit 
concluded in Gilbert, § 1635(f) only requires borrowers to exercise rescission within three years 
of consummating the transaction, and the rescission rights of borrowers who notify the lender of 
intent to rescind in accordance with§ 1635(f) and its accompanying regulation within three years 
should be protected. 
A. The Fourth Circuit's Reading of§ 1635(f) is Consistent with Congressional Intent and is 
Sensible Policy. 
§ 1635(f) must be read in the light most favorable to the consumer to be consistent with 
Congressional intent. A reading of§ 1635(f) that creates additional onerous requirements is in 
direct contrast with the goals of Congress. Moreover, allowing borrowers to satisfy§ 1635(f) via 
notification will not in any way cloud the title of mortgages during foreclosure. And finally, a 
broad reading of§ 1635(f) that allows borrowers to satisfy the three year window via notification 
is sensible public policy. 
1. The Fourth Circuit's Reading of§ 1635(f) is Consistent with Congress's Intent to 
use TILA and Regulation Z to Protect Consumers. 
A reading of§ 1635(f) that creates additional requirements contrary to the plain language 
of the statute is in direct contrast with Congressional intent. Courts generally agree that TILA is 
a remedial statute.232 Its stated purpose is to protect consumers against the uninformed use of 
credit offered by unscrupulous creditors.233 Given TILA's remedial nature, courts have also 
agreed that the statute should be interpreted liberally to protect consumers. 234 
232 See discussion infra Part ll.A. 
233 15 U.S.C. § 160l(a) (2006); see also Littlefield v. Walt Flanagan & Co., 498 F.2d 1133, 1136 (lOth Cir. 1974) 
(quoting N.C. Freed Co. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 473 F.2d 1210, 1214 (2d Cir. 1973)) ("The Act . 
. . designed to prevent 'unscrupulous and predatory creditor practices' ... is remedial."). 
234 See Bragg v. Bill Heard Chevrolet, Inc. , 374 F.3d 1060, 1065 (lith Cir. 2004) ("As a remedial statute, TILA 
must be construed liberally in favor of the consumer."); Begala v. PNC Bank, Ohio, Nat'l Ass'n, 163 F.3d 948, 950 
(6th Cir. 1998) ("We have repeatedly stated that TILA is a remedial statute and, therefore, should be given a broad, 
liberal construction in favor of the consumer."); King v. California, 784 F.2d 910,915 (9th Cir. Cal. 1986) (citation 
omitted) ("The courts have construed TILA as a remedial statute, interpreting it liberally for the consumer."); James 
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In addition to the well-established policy goals ofTILA, developments in the law reflect 
Congress' continuing concern with ensuring that borrowers' rescission rights remain strong. 
Since TILA's passage in 1968, Congress has had numerous opportunities to amend the rescission 
right but has chosen to keep the protection in tact. 235 And even after the 1995 Amendments 
sought to make compliance with disclosure requirements easier for lenders, rescission remained 
a powerful consumer protection.236 Congress had another chance to revisit TILA when it passed 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (hereinafter "Dodd-
Frank."i37 Dodd-Frank was passed with the goal, among others, of protecting consumers from 
abusive financial services practices.238 Dodd-Frank's main impact on TILA was to transfer 
rulemaking authority away from the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) and to the newly-created 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), an agency established with the goal of providing 
consumers with financial information and preventing unfair business practices. 239 
An example of the impact this transfer of power had on the direction of TILA is 
evidenced by both agencies' differing approaches to the rules for rescission under TILA. Under 
pressure from lenders, the FRB had proposed making rescission more difficult by requiring 
v. Home Constr. Co., 621 F.2d 727, 729 (5th Cir. Ala. 1980) (citation omitted)(" ... the Truth-in-Lending Act, a 
remedial act, has usually been given a broad liberal interpretation since it is assumed that was the intent of 
Congress."). 
235 See discussion infra ILA. 
236 Id; THOMPSON & RENUART, supra note 31, § 1.2.5 at 9 ("[T]he 1995 amendments provided some additional 
leeway to creditors in making certain TIL disclosures."); THOMPSON & RENUART, supra note 31, § 1.2.5 at 9 ("[T]he 
retention of the rescission remedy and the relatively low tolerance for defensive claims re-emphasized the particular 
important of TILA in providing a remedy for borrowers in foreclosure."). 
237 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat 1376 (2010). 
238 Id, Preamble (emphasis added) ("An Act To promote the tmancial stability of the United States by improving 
accountability and transparency in the tmancial system, to end "too big to fail", to protect the American taxpayer by 
ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive tmancial services practices, and for other purposes."). 
239 Id., § llOOA; see 15 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (2006) (current statute granting TILA rulemaking authority to the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau); see also THOMPSON & RENUART, supra note 31, § 1.2.1 1 , at 11 ; FALL 2011 
STATEMENT OF REGULATORY PRIORITIES, http://www .consumertmance.gov/regulations/fall-20 11-statement-of-
regulatory-priorities/ ("the purpose of the CFPB is to implement and enforce Federal consumer fmancial laws 
consistently for the purpose of ensuring that all consumers have access to markets for consumer fmancial products 
and services and that such markets are fair, transparent, and competitive."). 
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borrowers to first tender the amount due - reversing the normal process for TILA rescission. 240 
However, before these rules could be implemented, Congress transferred rule making authority 
to the CFPB, effective July 2011.241 The CFPB rejected the FRB's lender-friendly attempt to 
change the rules, and instead issued an interim final order affirming the practice that the 
consumer must tender only after the creditor has canceled the security interest. 242 Though the 
CFPB has proposed rule changes to implement the Dodd-Frank regulations and simplify 
disclosure requirements, it has rejected the Board's last-ditch effort to limit rescission rights and 
has not once proposed limiting rescission rights. 243 Congress's transfer of authority from the 
FRB to the CFPB represents its continuing intent to promote the consumer protections provided 
by statutes such as TILA, including the right to rescind. Therefore, TILA must continue to be 
interpreted with Congress's goal of protecting the consumer in mind. 
2. Allowing Borrowers to Exercise Rescission via Notification will not Cloud the 
Title of Mortgages. 
Allowing consumers to satisfy the limitations period by notifying the lender would not 
cloud the title of mortgages. The Rosenfield court was especially concerned with this issue, first 
expressed by the Supreme Court in Beach. 244 However, while the issue Beach dealt with did 
have serious implications for clouding the title of mortgages, that concern is not present in the 
context of borrowers exercising the rescission right. 
240 75 Fed. Reg. 58539, 58700-58704 (Sept. 24, 2010); see also Dougherty, supra note 18; discussion infra Part 
II.B.l. 
241 Jd 
242 Official Comment to Interim Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 79768, 79996 (Dec. 22, 2011) (Supplement Part I to 1 026) 
("Once the creditor has fulfilled its obligations under § 1 026.23( d)(2), the consumer must tender to the creditor any 
r,roperty or money the creditor has already delivered to the consumer."). 
43 See e.g., CONSUMER fiNANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU PROPOSES "KNOW BEFORE YOU OWE" MORTGAGE FORMS, 
http://www.consumerfmance.gov/pressreleases/consumer-fmancial-protection-bureau-proposes-know-before-you-
owe-mortgage-forms/; see also Sovem, Help for the Perplexed Home Buyer supra note 2. 
244 See discussion infra Part IIJ.C.2. 
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If a borrower exercises the rescission right by notifying the creditor, one of two things 
will happen. First, the lender may honor the rescission by complying with the procedures 
outlined in the statute and Regulation Z.245 The issue would be resolved without involving the 
court. Alternatively, the lender would not honor the rescission. In this scenario, the borrower 
would obviously cease payments on the mortgage if he or she believes it is rescinded. Either the 
borrower would take affirmative action to seek judicial enforcement of the rescission, or a 
foreclosure proceeding would be brought, and the issue would be litigated and resolved before 
the judgment and sale would be allowed to proceed. 
The only effect of allowing borrowers to exercise rescission this way is that if there are 
TILA violations, the borrower would be protected from foreclosure on an illegal loan. If there 
are no TILA violations, this would be resolved during litigation as part of the foreclosure 
proceeding - an inevitable proceeding after the borrower ceases payments - and the title will be 
clear. In the hard-to-imagine scenario where a borrower exercises rescission, but does not cease 
payments in an attempt to fool the lender, the borrower will likely be equitably estopped from 
asserting rescission as a defense, just as under common law rescission?46 Under any scenario, 
then, it is hard to imagine how allowing the borrower to exercise rescission via notification 
clouds the title of mortgages. 247 
245 See discussion infra Part II. B. 1. 
246 17B C.J.S. Contracts§ 647 ("An election to rescind the contract must be made by the party who has the right to 
rescind, and once the election is made, that party must adhere to it"); 31 C.J.S. Estoppel and Waiver§ 159 ("The 
doctrine of equitable estoppel precludes a person from maintaining a position or attitude which is inconsistent with 
another position or attitude sought to be maintained at the same time or which was asserted at a previous time."). 
247 It is important to note that exercising the rescission right is not the same as effecting rescission. See discussion 
infra Part II.B.2. While the issue of when the rescission is effected does indeed affect the mortgage- if rescission is 
effected unilaterally by notice, then some mortgages will have no force of law without the lender knowing -the 
issue of when the rescission right is exercised does not affect the mortgage title. 
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The Beach court clearly intended to prevent rescission from clouding the title of 
mortgages during foreclosure. 248 However, the Beach court accomplished this quite effectively 
by precluding tolling of§ 1635(f) and construing it strictly?49 Indeed, the specific argument that 
the Court was addressing when using the "cloud the title" language was whether to allow 
rescission claims to be raised at any time as defenses to recoupment action. 250 In other words, 
the Court addressed whether an exception can be made to§ 1635(f)'s three year window, and 
answered that question negatively on the basis of preventing mortgage titles from being 
clouded?51 By construing§ 1635(f) strictly and preventing tolling, the Supreme Court prevented 
rescission issues from clouding the title of mortgages. After Beach, the rescission right may not 
be asserted - whether as a filed claim, a notice of rescission, or as a defense to recoupment -
after the three year period. The Court simply did not address the method of exercising rescission 
within the three-year period, to which the issue of clouding title of mortgages is inapplicable. 
Courts should not read additional statutory requirements in a misguided attempt to 
promote Beach's principles, because it involved an entirely separate issue. Clouding the title of 
mortgages is simply not an issue for the issue of exercising rescission under§ 1635(f). 
3. It is Sensible Policy to Allow Notification of Rescission to Constitute an Exercise 
ofRescission Under§ 1635(£). 
It is sensible policy to enforce the plain language of§ 1635(f) because rescission is a 
powerful remedy for consumers that should not be subverted by activist courts seeking to read 
additional requirements into the statute. A policy that favors rescission is especially important 
248 Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410,418 (1998). 
249 See discussion infra Part lli.B. 
250 Beach, 523 U.S. at 418. 
251 Id; see also Jones v. Saxon Mortg., 537 F.3d 320, 327 (4th Cir. Va. 1998) (emphasis added) ("allowing tolling 
under§ 1635(t) and permitting a party to rescind after a foreclosure sale would create uncertainty in any chain of 
title of real estate purchased from a foreclosure sale. Real estate purchased from a foreclosure sale would be less 
marketable if purchasers could somehow later be divested of title. Similarly, title to real estate purchased from a 
foreclosure sale would be clouded."). 
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after the recent surge in foreclosures, possibly caused in part by the lack of effectiveness of 
disclosure requirements, has placed the homes of many borrowers at risk. Allowing consumers 
to satisfy§ 1635(f) via notification would enable the rescission statute and regulation to proceed 
more efficiently and effectively. 
The powerful remedy of rescission is even more essential after the recent explosion in 
foreclosure litigation. The housing bubble that preceded the foreclosure crisis was precipitated 
by many borrowers accepting loans that they could not hope to repay, and some argue that a 
primary cause of this was the inadequacy of TILA' s disclosure requirements. 252 While the 
inadequacies of the disclosure requirements have been questioned,253 those consumers who have 
not received even the disclosures required by law are often left with rescission as the sole way to 
keep their home and obtain a loan they can actually repay. Indeed, as foreclosure filings 
increased during the economic crisis, rescission became an increasingly powerful tool for 
consumers. 254 Thus, as the number of foreclosure filings increased, so have the number of 
rescission cases. 255 One observer has even referred to rescission as "the biggest hammer in the 
toolkit for a lawyer helping someone to save their home. "256 As a result of these considerations, 
it is in the public's interest to ensure that consumers who have been misled as a result of the 
practices of the mortgage industry have recourse to rescind these faulty transactions. It is not 
appropriate to read extra requirements into§ 1635 that would preclude borrowers from receiving 
this protection. Any public policy to the contrary should come from Congress, not the courts, 
due to the prevalence and complicated nature of the problem. 
252 Sovern, Help for the Perplexed Home Buyer supra note 2.; Sovem, supra note 14. 
253 Jd 
254 THE NEW YORK TIMES, supra note 19 (describing rescission as "the most effective legal tool that borrowers have 
to fight foreclosures."). 
255 Dougherty, supra note 18 (citing an estimate from Kathleen Day, spokeswoman for the Center for Responsible 
Lending, estimating "thousands" of rescission cases pending due to the economic crisis). 
256 Jd (quoting Ira Rheingold, executive director, National Association of Consumer Advocates). 
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Moreover, the statutory scheme articulated by TILA and Regulation Z works most 
efficiently when consumers can satisfy the limitations period by notifying the lender of 
rescission. Requiring borrowers to file a lawsuit to satisfy the limitations period is burdensome 
to the very consumers that Congress intended to protect. Under the statutory scheme, lenders are 
given twenty days to void the security transaction, after which point the borrower must tender 
payment.257 Reading§ 1635(t) to require borrowers to file a lawsuit complicates this process 
further. Filing a lawsuit is often costly, and borrowers who have been saddled with loans that 
they cannot repay should not be required to outlay money to initiate the lawsuit. TILA 
recognizes the precarious position these borrowers are in, which is why it only requires tender of 
payment after the lender voids the security interest - a clear reversal of the traditional common 
law rescission process. 258 Requiring borrowers to initiate litigation to satisfy the limitations 
period would upset this delicate balance. Indeed, neither the statute nor the regulation requires a 
court to oversee the rescission process. The statutory scheme has been described as an 
enhancement of common law rescission.259 The purpose of§ 1635 is to allow rescission without 
judicial intervention, and requiring borrowers to file a lawsuit to satisfy the limitation period 
would completely upend this process?60 A rule that encourages borrower's to file suit as soon as 
notifying the lender flies in the face of this non-judicial purpose of§ 1635. 
257 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d) (2011). 
258 Shepard, supra note 98; infra IV.B.3. Some courts have required a borrower to make a showing that she will be 
able to tender payment, before they will recognize rescission. See generally Shepard, supra note 98. However, 
courts are not always involved in rescission and not all courts require a showing of tender. See discussion infra 
II.B.l. In any case, the borrower does not have to actuaJiy tender any amount until after the security interest has 
been voided. Moreover, in many cases the borrower will negotiate a new loan with a new lender who will provide 
the tender to the original lender. See Dougherty, supra note 18. 
259 Shepard, supra note 98, at 188. 
260 See e.g., Belini v. Washington Mut. Bank, FA, 412 F.3d 17,25 (1st Cir. 2005) ("[S]ection 1635 is written with 
the goal of making the rescission process a private one, worked out between creditor and debtor without the 
intervention of the courts."). 
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Moreover, banks could, if they violated TILA, simply not respond to the borrower's letter 
or stonewall until the three-year period expires and then foreclose. The facts alleged in the 
Mc0mie-Gray261 case are a perfect example of this?62 The bank in that case responded to the 
notice of rescission by negotiating with Ms. McOmie until the limitations period expired. 263 Ms. 
McOmie was therefore precluded from a remedy for any disclosure violations. 264 A rule that 
encourages lenders to ignore letters of rescission or to stonewall until the limitations period has 
expired is unacceptable given TILA' s broad objective of protecting consumers from deceptive 
lenders. 265 
In addition, providing two separate methods of exercising the rescission right - the 
treatment of each depending on whether the right is exercised within the first three days or within 
the extended three year window- is likely to confuse consumers. 266 The current rule requires 
the notice of intent to rescind to include how to exercise the right to rescind, and for the lender to 
include a form of rescission with the lender's address on it. 267 The model form provided by the 
regulations clearly indicates that rescission is exercised by simply sending the form to the lender 
within three days. 268 Consumers are given clear instructions to exercise rescission by notifying 
the creditor - courts should not read additional requirements that do not appear in the statute, 
regulations, or notice forms. This will just confuse consumers who are never informed of the 
need to file a lawsuit within three years. 
B. The Plain Language of the Statute and Regulation Support Exercise via Notification 
261 McOmie-Gray v. Bank of America Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1326 (9th Cir. Feb. 8, 2012). 
262 See McOmie-Gray summary infra lli.C.3. 
263 McOmie-Gray, 667 F.3d at 1326. 
264 !d. 
265 See discussion infra Part IV .A.l. 
266 A proposed rule by the Federal Reserve Board noted that "[c]onsumers were confused when presented with a 
single disclosure that provided information about the three-business-day right to rescind and an extended right to 
rescind ... " 75 Fed. Reg. 58539 (Sept. 24, 2010). 
267 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(b XI )(iii) (20 11 ). 
268 See Figure 1. 
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The Fourth Circuit's plain language reading of§ 1635(f) is appropriate because the 
language is unambiguous. Moreover, the right of rescission for disclosure violations did not 
exist at common law and therefore should be governed strictly by the statute. After applying a 
plain language analysis relying solely on the words of the statute and accompanying regulation, 
it is clear that § 1635(f) only requires borrowers to exercise the rescission right via notification 
within three years. This interpretation is also completely consistent with the Supreme Court's 
holding ultimate holding in Beach, as well as principles of common law rescission. 
1. A Plain Language Reading Supports Exercise of Rescission via Notification. 
A plain language reading of§ 1635 supports the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that 
notification of rescission is sufficient to satisfy§ 1635(f). The right of action created by§ 1635 
and § 1640 did not exist at common law. 269 Though rescission rights generally do exist at 
common law/70 the right to rescind in response to TILA disclosure violations is statutorily ... 
created. 271 Because TILA created the right of rescission, any limitations on the right should be 
discerned from the statute itsel£272 Before limiting a statutory right, therefore, courts should rely 
upon the contours of that right as defined by the statute. Moreover, it is an axiom of statutory 
interpretation that courts initially "presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and 
269 Beach v. Great W. Bank, 670 So. 2d 986, 992 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1996) ("The right of rescission of a 
security interest for material violations of TILA disclosures is not a right existing under the common law. It is 
clearly and only the creation of statute."); James v. Home Constr. Co., 621 F.2d 727,729 (5th Cir. Ala. 1980) ("§ 
1635 is a statutorily created right."). 
270 See discussion infra Part IV.B.3. 
271 See Littlefield v. Walt Flanagan & Co., 498 F.2d 1133, 1136 (I Oth Cir. 1974) (quoting N.C. Freed Co. v. Bd. of 
Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 473 F.2d 1210, 1214 (2d Cir. 1973)) ("The Act ... designed to prevent 
'unscrupulous and predatory creditor practices' ... is remedial"); Begala v. PNC Bank, N.A., 163 F.3d 948, 950 
(6th Cir. Ohio 1998) ("We have repeatedly stated that TILA is a remedial statute."); Smith v. No.2 Galesburg 
Crown Finance Corp., 615 F.2d 407,415 (7th Cir. Ill. 1980) (finding that TILA action survives as remedial claim, 
and recognizing that "courts have tended to emphasize the remedial character of the statute."). 
272 Great W Bank, 610 So. 2d at 992 ("While the legislature may be without power to abolish common law rights, 
the legislature may create other rights and impose on them such limitations as it deems advisable. When it does, 
those limitations form part of the assertion of the right itself."). 
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means in a statute what it says there. "273 Thus, the starting point of any statutory analysis is the 
language of the statute itself.274 To aid in understanding statutory language, the statute must be 
read in context with all of its various provisions. 275 In addition, the Supreme Court has noted 
that courts should resist reading words into a statute that appears plain on its face. 276 And 
finally, the Supreme Court has stated that when a statute prescribes action by a particular mode, 
. 1 d . b I . d . d . h 277 tt prec u es action y a temattve mo es not menttone tnt e statute. 
Applying these principles to the language of§ 1635 reveals that the statute simply states 
that the right of rescission is exercised via notification of intent to rescind to the lender. Though 
§ 1635(f) itself is silent as to the proper method of exercising rescission, read in context it is 
clearly an extension of the same right guaranteed by the buyer's remorse provision. In reference 
to the three-day buyer's remorse rescission,§ 1635(a) states that a borrower may rescind the 
transaction by notifying the lender of his intent to do so in accordance with regulations. 278 § 
1635(f) simply states that the right of rescission expires after three years.279 Read together, these 
two provisions state that the right to rescind by notification in accordance with regulations 
expires after three years of the date of the transaction. 
Because§ 1635 is an extension of the same right provided for by the buyer's remorse 
provision, there is no reason to suggest that the statute contains an additional burden for 
borrowers asserting the right under§ 1635(f) as opposed to the buyer's remorse provision. 
273 Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-254 (1992). 
274 Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjomo, 494 U.S. 827, 835 (1990) (quoting Consumer Product Safety 
Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)) ("Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the 
contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive."). 
275 Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S. ex rei. Wilson, 545 U.S. 409,415 (2005) ("Statutory 
language has meaning only in context."). 
276 Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 572 (2009) (quoting Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, at 29 (1997)) 
(courts should "ordinarily resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face."). 
277 Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 583 (2000) (quoting Raleigh & Gaston R. Co. v. Reid, 80 U.S. (13 
Wall.) 269, 270 (1872)) ("[W]hen a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes a negative of 
any other mode."). 
278 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2006). 
279 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (2006). 
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Nothing in the language of the statutes differentiates between exercising rescission under the 
buyer's remorse provision or§ 1635(f)?80 Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has recognized that 
§ 1635 says nothing in terms of filing a lawsuit.281 The Supreme Court ruled that§ 1635(f) 
contains no lawsuit requirement and instead governs the life of the underlying rescission right282 
- the same exact right provided in the buyer's remorse provision, which is clearly exercised via 
notification?83 Therefore, it is a simple and logical inference that rescission is also exercised via 
notification for the purposes of§ 1635(f). Since notice of rescission is clearly sufficient to 
exercise rescission within three days, it is also sufficient to exercise rescission within three years 
under the terms of the statute?84 
Because the language is clear, courts should resist reading additional requirements, such 
as a filing requirement, into the statute. Courts should especially resist adding requirements 
when they are burdensome hurdles for the very same borrowers that TILA, a remedial statute, is 
intended to protect?85 Under the clear language of§ 1635(f), a borrower must notify the lender 
of rescission within three years to exercise rescission. If the borrower fails to do this, the right of 
rescission expires after the three year period runs. 
1. Sub-Issue: How Long do Borrowers have to Seek Judicial of 
Unacknowledged Rescissions? 
TILA' s language is not as clear on the issue of the time limitation for borrowers to seek 
judicial enforcement of rescission when rescission is proper but the lender fails to honor it. In 
280 Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., No. 07~5040, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137315, at *32 (E.D. Pa. May 7, 2010) 
("(N]either the statute nor the regulation requires the filing of suit within the time period, and neither differentiates 
between the notice required to invoke rescission within the three-day or the three-year period."). 
281 Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410,417 (1998). 
282Jd 
283 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a). 
284 Sherzer, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137315 at *32. 
285 infra note 3 7. 
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other words, if a borrower properly exercises the right to rescind by notifying the creditor, how 
long does she have under TILA to seek judicial enforcement if the lender fails to respond? 
Many courts applying the plain language analysis of§ 1635 have imposed the one-year 
statute of limitations under § 1640( e) to this type of situation. 286 Under this view, borrowers 
have one year after notifying of rescission to seek enforcement and damages from the lender's 
failure to honor rescission. However, while the one-year limit to seek a damage award for failure 
to honor rescission is clearly appropriate under the statute, it is unclear whether this can or 
should be used as a limit on seeking judicial enforcement of rescission?87 The courts have 
essentially read this one-year limitation on judicial enforcement into the statute. Perhaps the 
difficulty of resolving this issue is what has inspired some courts to make notification an 
insufficient exercise of rescission, in spite of the statutory language to the contrary. 288 
Nonetheless, it is hard to imagine the case where a borrower exercises rescission but does 
not seek to enforce it, either by refusing to make payments on the loan and forcing foreclosure or 
modification, or by seeking judicial enforcement. 289 In the rare instance where a borrower 
induces a lender to keep accepting payments after having purported to rescind the loan, the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel and axioms of common law contracts may be more appropriate to 
286 See In re Hunter, 400 B.R. 651, 660-61 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2009); Santos v. Countrywide Home Loans, No. 09-912, 
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71736, at *4-5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2009); Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271 
(4th Cir. N.C. 2012). Many courts have found a lender's failure to honor rescission creates a private cause of action 
for money damages. Because this action would be for money damages,§ 1640(e)'s one year limitation would 
clearly apply and begin to run at the date of the lender's failure to honor. 
287 The appropriateness of utilizing § 1640( e) to limit rescission actions is questionable because that provision is 
focused on actions seeking money damages and clearly does not encompass enforcement of equitable remedies such 
as rescission. The issue of seeking money damages for failure to honor rescission, on the other hand, is clearly 
contemplated by§ 1640(e). Infra note 286. 
288 See discussion infra Part IV .B.l 
289 See discussion infra Part IV.A.2. Moreover, no court disputes that exercising rescission in the initial three-day 
buyer's remorse period is satisfied via notification. The issue of the time limit on seeking judicial enforcement is as 
present in that situation as under the three year statute of repose - even if it does not arise nearly as often. Since it is 
not a problem under § 1635(a), it should not be a problem under§ 1635(f). 
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protect the lender than TILA's one-year damages limitation.29° For instance, under common law 
rescission, once a party rescinds a contract she is bound to adhere to the rescission?91 And the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel would protect the lender if a borrower seeks to enforce rescission 
after acting inconsistently with rescission. 292 Either of these doctrines would prevent bad faith 
borrowers from asserting rescission as a failsafe plan against some contemplated future default. 
These doctrines would also protect good faith lenders who fail to void the security interest, after 
relying upon a borrower's actions as opposed to her words. 
2. The Plain Language Reading is Consistent with Beach. 
As noted above, the plain language of § 163 5 indicates that notice of rescission is a 
proper exercise of the rescission right for the purposes of§ 1635(±)?93 Though some courts have 
found that the Supreme Court's decision in Beach mandates the opposite conclusion, 294 this 
reading is completely consistent with Beach. 
In Beach, the Court held that§ 1635(±) is a strict repose period for the rescission right.295 
As part of its holding, the Court stated that TILA "permits no federal right to rescind, defensively 
or otherwise, after the 3-year period of§ 1635(±) has run."296 However, the court made no effort 
to explain what actually constitutes an exercise of the right to rescind. 297 Indeed, the Beach 
290 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (2006). 
291 17B C.J.S. Contracts§ 647 ("An election to rescind the contract must be made by the party who has the right to 
rescind, and once the election is made, that party must adhere to it."); Grymes v. Sanders, 93 U.S. 55,62 (1876) 
("Where a party desires to rescind upon the ground of mistake or fraud, he must, upon the discovery of the facts, at 
once announce his purpose, and adhere to it. If he be silent, and continue to treat the property as his own, he will be 
held to have waived the objection, and will be conclusively bound by the contract, as if the mistake or fraud had not 
occurred. He is not permitted to play fast and loose. Delay and vacillation are fatal to the right which had before 
subsisted."). 
292 31 C.J.S. Estoppel and Waiver§ 159 ("The doctrine of equitable estoppel precludes a person from maintaining a 
position or attitude which is inconsistent with another position or attitude sought to be maintained at the same time 
or which was asserted at a previous time."). 
293 See discussion infra Part IV.B.1. 
294 See discussion infra Part Til. C. 
295 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
2
% Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410,419 (1998). 
297 See discussion infra Part lli.B. 
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decision was expressly concerned with rescission being asserted outside the three year time 
period contained in§ 1635(f); the Court did not explain how to properly assert the rescission 
right within the allowed three year period. 298 Therefore, Beach stands simply for the proposition 
that§ 1635(f) governs the life of the underlying rescission right, which expires after three years. 
But the Court did not explain the proper method of exercising rescission within three years -
whether it is accomplished by notice or lawsuit. Tellingly, the Court noted that§ 1635(f) does 
not mention filing a lawsuit.299 The issue of properly exercising rescission within the three-year 
period had already arisen by the time Beach was decided, 300 and if the Court had intended to 
address the issue it would have done so clearly. 
Even the underlying policy rationale of the Beach decision is consistent with borrowers 
exercising the rescission right for the purposes of§ 1635(f) via notification. In Beach, the Court 
was concerned with whether rescission claims could be raised as defenses to recoupment actions 
outside of 1635(f)'s three year window.301 The Court worried that allowing rescission claims to 
be raised perpetually as defenses in recoupment actions pursuant to § 1640( e) would "cloud the 
title" of mortgages during foreclosure. 302 However, this policy concern is simply not present in 
the context of deciding whether notice is a sufficient exercise of the rescission right for the 
purposes of§ 1635(f).303 Allowing borrowers who properly notify the lender of rescission within 
three years to be entitled to rescission has no effect on Beach's policy of preventing the clouding 
of mortgages, because the question of whether the loan was rescinded will be resolved within a 
298 ld 
299 Beach, 523 U.S. at 417 ("Subsection 1635(f) . . . says nothing in terms of bringing an action ... It talks not of a 
suit's commencement but of a right's duration."). 
300 See discussion infra Part TII.A.l . 
301 See discussion infra Part ill.B. 
302 Beach, 523 U.S. at418. 
303 See discussion infra Part IV.A.2. 
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reasonable time or during the foreclosure proceeding itself. 304 Therefore, the view that notice of 
rescission satisfies§ 1635(f) is completely consistent with both the holding of Beach and its 
underlying rationale. Courts should not read additional requirements into the statute based on a 
misguided attempt to promote Beach's principles. 305 
3. Principles of Common Law Rescission Also Support the Plain Reading of § 
1635(f). 
It is a principal of statutory construction that statutes should be construed with reference 
to common law principals, and that statutes should not be read to incorporate changes to the 
common Jaw unless clearly prescribed. 306 On the other hand, principles of the common law 
cannot be used to override the intentions of Congress?07 
Rescission as a contract remedy has existed at the common law for many years. 308 At the 
common law, rescission was exercised when the aggrieved party that has the right to rescind 
expresses it. 309 Thus, courts have held that rescission is a "fact" that is "complete" whether the 
aggrieved party makes the fact known to the other party, either by lawsuit or by unequivocal 
notice.310 Under the common law, the other party has the opportunity to accept the rescission, 
304 Id 
305 Cohens v. State of Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,399-400,5 L.Ed. 257 (1821) ("[G]eneral expressions, in 
every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the 
case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is 
presented for decision."). 
306 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 473 ("In case of ambiguity, statutes are to be construed with reference to the principles of the 
common law in force at the time of their passage, and statutes are not to be interpreted as effecting any change in the 
common law beyond that which is clearly indicated."); Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 392 
(1970) ("It has always been the duty of the common-law court to perceive the impact of major legislative 
innovations and to interweave the new legislative policies with the inherited body of common-law principles."); 
Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Mach. Corp., 359 U.S. 297, 304 (1959) (quoting Shaw v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 
101 U.S. 557, 565 (1879) ("(n)o statute is to be construed as altering the common law, farther than its words 
import."). 
307 Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1709 (2012) ("Congress plainly can override those [common 
law] principles."). 
308 See e.g., Grymes v. Sanders, 93 U.S. 55 (1876). 
309 17B C.J .S. Contracts § 648 ("A clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal notice of rescission from the aggrieved 
~arty to the other party to the contract generalJy is necessary to effect a rescission of the contract."). 
10 E.g., Cunningham v. Pettigrew, 169 F. 335, 341 (8th Cir. 1909) ("Rescission is a fact, the assertion by one party 
to avoidable contract of his right (if such he had) to avoid it, and when the fact is made known to the other party, 
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and the issue is resolved without the involvement of courts.311 However, if the other party rejects 
rescission, the borrower may file a lawsuit to enforce the rescission, but cannot seek damages 
under the contract.312 If notice of rescission was given and is considered valid, the judicial 
proceeding is an equitable proceeding to determine whether to confirm or deny the rescission -
in other words, to confrrm or deny the earlier exercise of the rescission right, to establish whether 
the aggrieved party had the right in the first place, and to restore the parties through restitution.313 
Traditionally, under the common law a showing of tender by the borrower was necessary before 
a court would grant the equitable remedy ofrescission.314 The purpose of this common law 
process is to restore the parties to the status quo ante, as if the contract was never signed in the 
first place.315 
TILA' s rescission remedy has been viewed as enhancing the protections that the common 
law rescission remedy provides to consumers.316 The procedures outlined by the statute seem to 
whether by a suit or in any other unequivocal way, the rescission is complete."); Griggs v. E.l. DuPont de Nemours 
& Co., 385 F.3d 440, 445-56 (4th Cir. 2004) ("[R]escission itself is effected when the plaintiff gives notice to the 
defendant that the transaction has been avoided and tenders to the defendant the benefits received by the plaintiff 
under the contract."). 
311 C. Brown Trucking Co. Inc. v. Henderson, 305 Ga. App. 873, 874 (2010) (citation omitted) ("Parties may by 
mutual consent abandon an existing contract between them so as to make it not thereafter binding and the contract 
may be rescinded by conduct as well as by words."). 
312 Hooker v. Norbu, 899 N.E.2d 655, 658 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) ("[R]escission of such contract terminates it with 
restitution."); 17B C.J.S. Contracts§ 656 ("The rescission of a contract precludes the recovery of damages for 
breach of contract, since rescission and damages for breach of contract are inconsistent remedies and the decision to 
pursue one remedy bars the other remedy."). 
313 See e.g., Peterson v. Highland Music, Inc., 140 F.3d 1313, 1322 (9th Cir. 1998) ("When a party gives notice of 
rescission, it has effected the rescission, and any subsequent judicial proceedings are for the purpose of confrrming 
and enforcing that rescission."). 
314 Williams v. Homestake Mortg. Co., 968 F.2d 1137, 1140 (11th Cir. 1992) ("Under common law rescission, the 
rescinding party must first tender the property that he has received under the agreement before the contract may be 
considered void."). 
315 Grymes v. Sanders, 93 U.S. 55, 62 (1876) ("A court of equity is always reluctant to rescind, unless the parties can 
be put back in statu quo. If this cannot be done, it will give such relief only where the clearest and strongest equity 
imperatively demands it."); Am. Serv.lns. Co. v. ·united Auto. Ins. Co., 409111. App. 3d 27,35 (2011) ("Rescission 
is the cancellation of a contract thereby restoring the parties to their initial status."). 
316 Shepard, supra note 98, at 188 (20 I 0) ("TILA's rescission provisions shift significant leverage to consumers by 
enhancing the protections provided to consumers under common law causes of action and remedies, the oldest and 
most basic forms of consumer protection."). 
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acknowledge the common law framework for rescission, 317 but add a few key differences to 
protect consumers. For instance, whereas grounds for rescission under the common law for 
fraud must have been pled with particularity to be confirmed, TILA liberalizes the requirements 
by establishing disclosure violations as strict liability for the purposes of rescission.318 
Additionally, TILA provides borrowers with up to three years to rescind the contract,319 whereas 
under the common law rescission must be brought within a reasonable time. 320 And 
significantly, TILA reverses the tender requirement, requiring the lender to void the security 
interest before the borrower is required to tender payment. 321 By reversing the tender 
requirement, TILA provides consumers with extra leverage and more time to obtain financing to 
tender.322 
Despite the few changes to the rescission process made by TILA, the plain reading 
interpretation of§ 1635(£) is consistent with the basic principles of common law rescission. 
Under this view, rescission may be resolved without involvement of the courts,323 but the court is 
petitioned to either confirm or deny the validity of the rescission and to govern the restitution 
process.324 Similarly, the common law grants the right to rescind to certain parties in certain 
317 See discussion infra Part II.B.l. 
318 Shepard, supra note 98, at 189. 
319 15 U.S.C. § 1635(t) (2006). 
320 17B C.J.S. Contracts§ 641 ("The right to rescind a contract must be exercised promptly or within a reasonable 
time on discovery of facts from which the right arises, but what constitutes a reasonable time depends on the 
circumstances of the particular case."). 
321 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2006); 12 C.P.R.§ 226.23(d) (2011). Some courts have re-ordered the statutory rescission 
process by implementing a conditional rescission requirement. See generally Shepard, supra note 98; 15 U .S.C. § 
1635(b) ("The procedures prescribed by this subsection shall apply except when otherwise ordered by a court."). 
322 Shepard, supra note 98, at 192. 
323 Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1183 n.8 (lOth Cir. Colo. 2012) (recognizing in dicta that if the 
lender responds affirmatively to the borrower's notice of intent to rescind under TILA, rescission may be 
"complete" and enforceable by a court in equity.). 
324 Belini v. Washington Mut. Bank, F.A., 412 F.3d 1517, 25 (1st Cir. 2005) (emphasis added) ("[S]ection 1635 is 
written with the goal of making the rescission process a private one, worked out between creditor and debtor without 
the intervention of the courts."). 
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circumstances, and the right may be exercised by a unilateral expression of intent to rescind. 325 
The right must be invoked within a reasonable time upon discovery of the cause for rescission, 326 
and a court may later grant an equitable remedy of rescission if the party seeking to rescind was 
justified.327 § 1635(f) changes this common law process by mandating the time limit for the 
rescission right to be invoked: instead of being limited by "reasonableness," the period to 
exercise rescission is expanded to three years. In most other respects, this reading of§ 1635(f) is 
consistent with the underlying process involved at common law rescission. 
The Rosenfield court sought to justify its restrictive holding that§ 1635(f) requires the 
filing of a lawsuit on common law grounds. 328 While the court accurately described TILA 
rescission as analogous to common law rescission, 329 the court nonetheless found that a key 
policy behind common law rescission- "remedial economy" -justified its restrictive view of§ 
1635(f).330 The court found that the difficulties in enforcing the Fourth Circuit's view of§ 
1635(f) would jeopardize remedial economy by clouding the title of mortgages with the potential 
for rescission indefinitely. 331 However, the Rosenfield court's argument is based upon the 
erroneous assumption that permitting rescission to be exercised via notification would cloud the 
title of mortgages. Because invoking rescission via notification does not burden mortgage 
325 17B C.J .S. Contracts § 646 ("As a general rule, to effect a rescission of a contract, an affmnative act on the part 
of the person desiring to rescind is necessary, and a contract may be rescinded by the parties by their conduct as well 
as by words."). 
326 17B C.J .S. Contracts § 641 ("The right to rescind a contract must be exercised promptly or within a reasonable 
time on discovery of facts from which the right arises, but what constitutes a reasonable time depends on the 
circumstances of the particular case."). 
327 Peterson v. Highland Music, Inc., 140 F.3d 1313, 1322 (9th Cir. 1998) ("When a party gives notice of rescission, 
it has effected the rescission, and any subsequent judicial proceedings are for the purpose of confmning and 
enforcing that rescission."). 
328 Rosenfield, 681 F .3d at 1184-1185. 
329 ld. at 1184 ("[W]e ascertain no basis for concluding that the TILA rescission remedy differs in any material 
respect from the general form of rescission available [at common Jaw.]"). 
330 ld at 1184 (internal quotation omitted) ("The primary justification of rescission, however, is remedial economy . 
. . it is not an appropriate remedy in circumstances where its application would lead to prohibitively difficult (or 
impossible) enforcement."). 
331 Id at 1185 ("The problem with [the exercise via notification] argument is that, in a significant number of 
instances, the remedial economy of the remedy would be jeopardized."). 
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titles,332 the Rosenfield court's argument is undercut. Instead, the Fourth Circuit's reading of§ 
1635(f) is indeed consistent with common law rescission. 
C. To the Extent that§ 1635(f) is Silent or Ambiguous, Courts Should Defer to Regulation 
Z's interpretation. 
If any silence or ambiguity is to be found in the statute itself, courts should give 
deference to the accompanying regulation. TILA provides the CFPB with the authority to 
promulgate regulations implementing TILA and to determine what constitutes notification of 
rescission.333 Regulation Z clearly states that for a consumer to exercise the right to rescind, the 
consumer must "notify the creditor of rescission by mail, telegram or other means of written 
communication. "334 The regulation then states that the right of rescission expires after three 
years if certain disclosures are not made.335 Read together, these regulations state that the right 
to rescind "by mail, telegram, or other means of written communication" expires after three years 
if certain disclosures are not made. Nothing in the language of either the statute or the regulation 
requires the filing of a lawsuit to assert rescission. Moreover, the regulation does not 
differentiate between exercising rescission under§ 1635(f) and under the buyer's remorse 
provision. Indeed, the regulations governing the method of exercising rescission, providing 
buyer's remorse rescission, and extending the right to three years are all under the general 
"Consumer's Right to Rescind" heading.336 The CFPB's proposed rescission rule maintains this 
organization of the regulation,337 and the CFPB itself has taken the position in litigation that § 
332 See discussion infra Part IV.A.2. 
333 15 U.S.C. § 1602(a) (2006) ("The Bureau shall prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of this title,"); 15 
U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2006) ("[T]he obligor shall have the right to rescind ... by notifying the creditor, in accordance 
with regulations of the Bureau, of his intention to do so."). 
334 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(2) (2011 ). 
335 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3). 
336 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a). 
337 2012 Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z) {Interim Final Rule), Docket No. CFPB-2011--0031, 76 Fed. Reg. 
79768, 79803 (December 22, 2011). 
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1635(f) only requires rescission via notification.338 Thus, Regulation Z's interpretation of§ 
163 5( f) is that a borrower's notification of rescission satisfies the three year time extension. 
Whereas§ 1635(f) may be considered vague or at least imprecise on the issue, Regulation Z 
suggests that exercising rescission is the same under either the buyer's remorse provision or§ 
1635(f). This raises the question of whether this interpretation is entitled to deference by the 
courts. 
The hallmark case concerning judicial deference to executive agencies remains Chevron 
USA. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 339 With respect to Regulation Z in 
particular, the Supreme Court has often favored the deferential Chevron approach. 34° Chevron 
established a two-part test to determine whether a regulation is binding on the courts. First, 
courts ask whether Congress has directly spoken on the interpretation problem at issue.341 If the 
statutory language or Congressional intent is clear, courts - and the regulatory agency- must 
give effect to the intent of Congress.342 Next, courts ask whether the regulation is "arbitrary, 
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. "343 If the regulation is reasonable, it is given 
controlling weight. 344 When an agency has expressed its opinion in an informal manner that 
338 Brief for Amicus CFPB, Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank ,USA, 681 F.3d 1172 (lOth Circ. Colo. 2010) (No. 10-1442), 
available at http:/ /files.consumerfmance.gov/f/20 1203 _ cfpb _Rosenfield_ vs _ HSBC _Amicus. pdf; Brief for Amicus 
CFPB, Sobieniak v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. (2012) (No. 12-1053), available at 
http://files.consumerfmance.gov/f/20 1204 _ CFPB _ Sobieniak-amicus-brief.pdf. 
339 467 u.s. 837 (1984). 
340 See e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565 (1980) ("(C]aution must temper judicial 
creativity in the face of legislative or regulatory silence ... deference is especially appropriate in the process of 
interpreting the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z."); Anderson Bros. Ford v. Valencia, 452 U.S. 205, 219 
(1981) ("(A]bsent some obvious repugnance to the statute, the ... regulation implementing [TILA] should be 
accepted by the courts.''); Household Credit Servs. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 238 (2004); Household Credit Servs. v. 
Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232,238-239 {2004). 
341 Jd. at 842. 
342 Id. at 842-843. 
343 /d. at 843-844. 
344 /d. 
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lacks the force of law, such as an opinion letter, the agency's opinion is not entitled to Chevron 
deference but is still entitled to respect as an aid to statutory interpretation. 345 
With respect to the first prong of Chevron, § 163 5( f) may be said to be ambiguous 
because, unlike the buyer's remorse provision,§ 1635(f) does not specify the proper method of 
rescission. Though the context of the statute suggests Congressional intent to have rescission 
exercised the same way under either provision,346 it is possible that the inartfullack of precision 
in the language of§ 1635(f) may be interpreted as a gap in the statute. Similarly, though the 
Congressional intent behind TILA!> and particularly its recent transfer of rulemaking authority to 
the CFPB, suggests that Congress is interested in easing requirements for borrowers/47 this can 
hardly be considered a clear statement on this specific issue by Congress. 
These considerations allow the analysis to proceed to the second part of Chevron: 
whether the regulation is a reasonable construction of the statute. Regulation Z' s interpretation 
of§ 1635(f) is not arbitrary or capricious and therefore should be given deference. First, the 
regulation's interpretation of§ 1635(f) is consistent with similar statutes of repose in many other 
contexts. Look for "bar date" deadline to file claims in bankruptcy For instance, the Universal 
Commercial Code as enacted in New York contains a one-year statute of repose that requires 
bank customers to object within one year of receiving notice of an unauthorized wire transfer.348 
If objection is not made, the right to be reimbursed by the bank extinguishes.349 This is an 
example of a statute of repose that is satisfied not by filing a lawsuit, but by engaging in some 
other sort of action to preserve a right granted by statute. Since these types of statutes - granting 
345 Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (internal quotation omitted) ("Interpretations such as 
those in opinion letters-like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement 
guidelines, all of which lack the force of law-do not warrant Chevron-style deference . . . Instead, interpretations 
contained in formats such as opinion letters are entitled to respect.). 
346 See discussion infra Part N .B.l. 
347 See discussion infra Part IV .A.l. 
348 See e.g., N.Y. UCC § 4-A-505. 
349 ld. 
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a right, but allowing it to be preserved by an action other than filing a lawsuit within a set time 
period- exist in other contexts, Regulation Z's interpretation of§ 1635(f) to be this type of 
statute is hardly arbitrary. 
In addition, Regulation Z' s lack of arbitrariness is evident from considerations of 
Congressional intent, Supreme Court precedent, and principles of common law. As noted above, 
a borrower-friendly reading of§ 1635(f) is consistent both with the underlying goals ofTILA 
and the recent actions by Congress seeking to expand consumer protection laws. 350 The 
Regulation Z interpretation is also consistent with the Supreme Court's reasoning and policy 
rationale outline in Beach,351 and with the process of common law rescission.352 Finally, 
Regulation Z' s interpretation is in accordance with the principal that remedial statutes should be 
construed liberally to protect the people the statute sought to help.353 Thus, Regulation Z's 
interpretation can not be considered arbitrary or capricious. 
None of the Courts of Appeals ruling on this issue even passed on the issue of providing 
deference to the regulation.354 However, to the extent that§ 1635(f) is silent concerning the 
proper method of exercising rescission, Regulation Z should be given deference as an 
administrative gap-filler. 
V. Proposed Solutions 
Though the statutory and regulatory language appear to state that exercise of rescission is 
accomplished via notification to the lender, either Congress or the Supreme Court may act to 
resolve the split among the circuits. A gross misinterpretation of a Supreme Court case, as well 
350 See discussion infra Part IV .A.l 
351 See discussion infra Part IV.B.2. 
352 See discussion infra TV .B.3. 
353 See e.g., King v. California, 784 F.2d 910,915 (9th Cir. Cal. 1986) (citation omitted) ("The courts have construed 
TlLA as a remedial statute, interpreting it liberally for the consumer."). 
354 See discussion infra Part III. C. 
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as an inartfully drawn statute, has placed into jeopardy the rescission rights of many borrowers. 
The following two fixes should repair the situation. 
A. The Supreme Court Can Resolve the Split Created by Beach. 
The split between the circuits concerning the exercise of rescission rights has largely 
been the result of the Supreme Court's decision in Beach and the subsequent surge in foreclosure 
filings that occurred during the fmancial crisis of the 2000s. 355 The Fourth Circuit has read § 
1635(f) to only require notice of rescission, but the Third, Ninth, and Tenth circuits have reached 
the opposite conclusion largely by relying on the Beach decision. 356 The issue is currently 
pending before the Eighth Circuit,357 and district and bankruptcy courts throughout the country 
have disagreed on this issue. 
As a result of this confusion, the Supreme Court should revisit§ 1635(f). The Court 
should clarify that Beach only stood for the proposition that§ 1635(f) is a strict three year time 
limitation on rescission claims, and that the Court did not rule on the proper method of 
exercising the right to rescind within the three year period. Instead, the Court should confirm 
that the plain meaning of the statute and accompanying regulations detail the exercise of the 
rescission right. The Court should clarify that, as under buyer's remorse rescission, a borrower 
can exercise the right to rescind under§ 1635(f) by notifying the lender of rescission. If the 
lender is properly and timely notified, the rescission right has been exercised and a court may 
confirm or deny the rescission in a subsequent proceeding. 358 
B. A Legislative Amendment To Clarify§ 1635 
355 ld 
356 ld 
357 Sobieniak v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, No. 12-1053 (8th Cir.). 
358 The Court may also seek to answer the growing question of whether notification immediately voids the 
transaction, or whether the transaction is only legally voided after confmnation by a court. See discussion infra Part 
II.B.2. This Comment does not take a position on this issue. 
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As discussed, under the terms of the statute there is little reason to conclude that 
exercising the three-day rescission right is any different from exercising the three-year extended 
rescission right. 359 Regulation Z, by incorporating both modes of exercising rescission into the 
same regulatory heading, agrees with this interpretation.360 Nonetheless, a legislative 
amendment can make the statute even more clear. Such an amendment must clearly indicate that 
the mode of exercising the rescission right is the same under either buyer's remorse rescission or 
§ 1635(f). A simple amendment to§ 1635(f) would accomplish this. An example of proposed 
legislation is provided in Figure 2, with the proposed amended language underlined. 361 
Figure 2 - Sample Proposed Legislation to Clarify the Exercise of Rescission Rights under § 
1635(f). 
§ 163 5. Right of rescission as to certain transactions 
(f) Time limit for exercise of right. An obligor's right of rescission shall expire three 
years after the date of consummation of the transaction or upon the sale of the 
property, whichever occurs first, unless the right of rescission is exercised by 
notifying the creditor, in accordance with regulations of the Bureau, of his intention 
to rescind, 
VI. Conclusion 
The Truth In Lending Act's right of rescission is an important remedy for many 
borrowers, particularly those borrowers who have accepted loans with no hope of repayment. 
The rescission right is a strict liability right to rescind certain loans, and the right extends to up to 
three years after the date of the transaction pursuant to§ 1635(f) ofTILA. Since the collapse of 
the housing industry, and subsequent drop in the value of homes, many borrowers are in no 
position to hire a lawyer and initiate costly litigation just to have the right of rescission survive 
the statutorily-prescribed period. Moreover, many of these borrowers have made good-faith 
359 See discussion infra Part IV.B.I 
360 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a) (2011). 
361 Infra Figure 2. 
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attempts to comply with the law, by relying on indications on the notice of rescission form that 
rescission is accomplished via notification, but have had their rescission claims rejected by 
courts as untimely. Other borrowers have encountered lenders that, after receiving notice of 
rescission, cynically stonewall with hopeless negotiations until the repose period for rescission 
expires, after which point they file a foreclosure complaint. 
The Truth In Lending Act must be read to allow rescission claims to survive if notice of 
rescission has been provided to the lender within three years of the consummation of the loan. A 
contrary reading of the statute punishes good faith borrowers who discover disclosure violations 
late- presumably, after encountering trouble keeping up with payments. These borrowers are 
often in fmancial distress and lack legal sophistication. Moreover, requiring these borrowers to 
file a lawsuit rewards the cynical lenders who choose to either ignore notices of intent to rescind 
or, as in the case of Ms. McOmie-Gray, goad the borrower with negotiation only to foreclosure 
after the three year period expires. 
The Supreme Court itself has noted that neither the statute nor regulations discuss any 
requirement that borrowers must file a lawsuit in order for their rescission claims to survive the 
repose period. Indeed, as the Fourth Circuit and many lower courts concluded, the plain 
language of TILA simply requires borrowers to notify the lender of intention to rescind within 
three years. Other circuits have read an additional requirement into the law, requiring borrowers 
to notify lenders of rescission and to file a lawsuit seeking rescission within three years. These 
courts have largely relied on and misinterpreted Supreme Court doctrine. A correction of these 
misinterpretations is necessary to protect good faith borrowers and prevent lenders from escaping 
liability for TILA violations by stonewalling borrowers. 
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As noted, the plain language of TILA and the regulations support the Fourth Circuit view 
that notice is a sufficient exercise of rescission. This interpretation is completely consistent with 
the holdings of Supreme Court precedent, as well as the underlying policy rationales behind that 
precedent. This interpretation is also consistent with the principles underlying common law 
rescission, and the recent public policies pursued by a Congress interested in protecting 
borrowers from unfair credit practices. Finally, given TILA's nature as a remedial statute, and 
the courts' admonishment that it must be interpreted it in the light most favorable to borrowers, 
the plain language of the statute should be relied upon by courts interpreting§ 1635(f). 
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